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Humans imitate in a unique way. They imitate selectively, that is, they imitate 
intentional actions at a higher rate than accidental ones. At the same time humans tend to 
faithfully imitate actions that do not seem to be relevant to an end goal. Selectively 
imitating intentional actions allows us to learn efficiently from others, while faithful 
imitation makes it possible to acquire complex cultural conventions without immediately 
understanding the contribution of each of its components. Recent studies suggest that this 
unique way of imitating is universal across cultures and enables humans to develop 
complex cultural practices that set them apart from other species. The evidence so far, 
however, is almost exclusively based on studies about the imitation of actions, while little 
work has been done on the imitation of language. Language is arguably humanity's most 
important cultural product and unlike instrumental actions that are restricted by the laws 
of physics, language is a fairly arbitrary system of conventions and thus more prone to 
cross-cultural variance. Claims about the cultural universality in imitation learning thus 
need to be supported by data from verbal imitation.  
The present work addresses this point in four studies. The first three studies tested 
children's imitation of adjectives in different contexts across three different cultures: a 
small indigenous community in Mexico and two western large-scale societies. In various 
verbal imitation tasks we found cross-cultural differences. We propose that these 
 
 vi 
differences are due to differences in the amount of time spent in dyadic caregiver-child 
interaction in indigenous and western culture. Further, the data suggest that this cultural 
variation arises from the fact that humans across cultures in both verbal and instrumental 
tasks imitate selectively when the function of an element is transparent to them. When its 
function is opaque they do the safe thing: faithfully imitate. This account is tested in 
study four. In an instrumental task adults and children imitated faithfully when the 
function of the actions performed was opaque, but not when they were transparent. This 
allows us to propose that the cross-cultural differences we observe are thus due to 
differences in experience that make different aspects of language use more or less 
transparent to learners. 
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SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION 
A great deal of research on imitation in humans over the last few decades has 
suggested that it involves the use of cognitive abilities that go beyond reflexive behaviors 
and rote copying. When imitating, humans determine which actions performed by a 
model are intentional and which are necessary to achieve the outcome, and prefer to 
imitate those over accidental and redundant actions (Meltzoff, 1995; Carpenter, Akhtar 
and Tomasello, 1998).  Furthermore humans also take into account the means that an 
actor has at his or her disposal. If the actor chooses a seemingly less efficient strategy 
over an obvious and more efficient alternative this suggests the presence of a hidden 
intention behind the action, resulting in a higher imitation rate (Gergely, Bekkering and 
Király, 2002).  
Despite these insights, humans still imitate redundant and accidental actions at a 
high rate (Horner and Whiten, 2005). This is widely known as over or faithful imitation. 
As other great apes do not display such over imitation, it might be that this behavior is a 
factor in enabling the development of complex cultural conventions that set humans apart 
from other animals (Ramscar and Gitcho, 2007). Most research investigating over 
imitation in non-Western cultures suggests that the presence of over imitation is 
culturally invariant (Nielsen and Tomaselli, 2010, but see Berl and Hewlett, 2015 for a 
striking exception). Other research, however, has identified cross-cultural differences in 
the context in which over imitation occurs, for example, instrumental versus normative 





Although there is a large body of research on mimicry in language acquisition, 
work on more complex imitative behavior, which involves the use of social-cognitive 
abilities, such as intention reading, is still relatively scarce. The next section will discuss 
the difference between mimicry and the more complex imitation mechanisms that the 
present research is concerned with in greater detail. Most research on that second kind of 
imitation that goes beyond mimicry has focused on the instrumental domain, that is, the 
imitation of actions, with little work having been done on verbal imitation. This poses a 
major problem to anyone interested in developing an overarching theory of imitation in 
humans. Language is arguably our most important cultural product and thus a topic of 
interest in many disciplines. Unlike instrumental actions, which are constrained by the 
laws of physics (for instance, the ways in which one can use a marble run are constrained 
by gravity, as the marble will always run downwards), language is an arbitrary system of 
conventions agreed on by a community of speakers (Lewis, 1969). Thus drawing general 
conclusions about human imitative behavior solely on the basis of findings from studies 
on instrumental imitation might not tell the whole story. Investigating verbal imitation at 
the same level of depth as that used in exploring instrumental imitation has the potential 
to yield benefits that will be felt beyond the language research community. 
So far research suggests that verbal imitation makes use of the same social-
cognitive abilities as instrumental imitation (Over and Gattis, 2010; Bannard, Klinger and 
Tomasello, 2013) and that humans over imitate words as they do actions (Bannard, 
Klinger and Tomasello, 2013), but there are no studies exploring verbal imitation across 
cultures. This is important because while the literature on instrumental imitation is 
mainly concerned with finding universal patterns (e.g., Nielsen and Tomaselli, 2010; see 





there is reason to suspect that there is more cross-cultural variance in the imitation of 
language. Although all languages allow speakers to communicate efficiently, there are 
pronounced differences not only in the formal features of languages, but also in the way 
in which they are used by their speakers (Evans and Levinson, 2010).  
The present research aims to explore verbal imitation across different cultures, by 
conducting the three adjective imitation experiments reported in a previously published 
paper (Bannard, Klinger and Tomasello, 2013) in the small indigenous community of 
Santa Lucia Teotepec in Oaxaca Mexico inhabited by Chatino people. In contrast to the 
German children tested in Bannard, Klinger and Tomasello (2013), who grow up in a 
loosely knit large-scale industrial society, Chatino children grow up in a tightly knit 
small-scale agricultural community. The population of Teotepec is about fourteen 
hundred inhabitants. Teotepec Chatino, the dialect spoken in Teotepec is a variety of  
Eastern Chatino, an Otomanguan language. It usually follows a VSO word order and has 
a strikingly complex tone system (McIntosh, 2015). Apart from the structure of society 
and the grammatical properties of the language, there is another difference between 
Chatino and western culture: child rearing practices. Unlike western children, who spend 
the majority of their time in caregiver-child dyads in their homes, Chatino children pass 
much time with their peers in the larger community. This can be expected to have an 
effect on the linguistic experience of children.  
The primary goal of the present research is to explore the effects of different 
cultural practices and the differences in language use that they bring with them on 
imitation behavior in the indigenous Chatino children on the one hand, and western 
children on the other hand. The first two of four experiments are recreations of Bannard, 





play an imitation game with the child participants that allows us to test whether in verbal 
imitation they take into account a novel word’s function in the context of the utterance. 
Experiment 3 is a replication of Bannard, Klinger and Tomasello’s experiment three. We 
investigated whether, like German children, Chatino children are able to use intention-
reading skills when imitating verbal material. The insights from the three experiments 
above allow us to put forward a general theory on when humans imitate regardless of 
domain (instrumental or verbal) and culture (western or indigenous). Experiment 4, 
conducted on children and adults provides a first test of that theory. 
The second section of this dissertation contains background information on 
research on instrumental and verbal imitation, a discussion of cultural differences around 
the world including cross-cultural differences in child rearing, as well as an overview of 
referring expressions, the crucial verbal elements for the current studies. The third section 








     SECTION 2:  BACKGROUND 
This section discusses relevant background information. Although a small number 
of recent studies investigate verbal imitation, most research on imitation in 
developmental psychology has focused on the instrumental domain. This means not only 
that many of the terms used to describe different imitative behavior stem from work on 
instrumental imitation, but also that most of the general insights into imitative behavior, 
be it verbal or instrumental, were gained by exploring the imitation of actions. 
Additionally, much of the research done in the verbal domain aims to establish whether 
the same fundamental cognitive abilities that are utilized in the imitation of actions also 
account for the imitation of verbal material. In order to give an overview of the aspects of 
imitation that are relevant to an understanding of the present research, this section 
introduces different aspects of imitation through describing studies undertaken on 
instrumental action. It then proceeds to give a similar overview of the work on verbal 
imitation. Thereafter it includes sections on referring expressions (the type of verbal 
material that is most crucial to the present research), Chatino culture and language, and a 











Chapter 1: Instrumental Imitation 
This section provides an overview of relevant research on instrumental imitation. 
The first section introduces a variety of terms used to differentiate between simple and 
more complex imitative behaviors and describes the social-cognitive that they entail in 
greater detail, followed by a section that focuses on another uniquely human trait of 
imitation: the fact that humans, but not other animals, faithfully imitate. Alongside a 
general explanation of how such faithful imitation could facilitate cultural learning, a 
series of experiments that investigate the reasons behind faithful imitation is discussed. 
Last I present a summary of cross-cultural work on instrumental imitation. 
 
1.1 THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF IMITATIVE BEHAVIOR 
The literature on animal learning uses more specific terms for what popular 
parlance has loosely called imitation. The following explains imitative behaviors of 
varying complexity according to the terminology used by Want and Harris (2002) and 
contrasts simpler imitative behavior with the more complex imitation that the present 
research is concerned with. 
Local enhancement and stimulus enhancement are two related types of social 
learning behavior. The former refers to the process of seeing a model perform an action at 
a particular location, which in return enhances the child's interest in that location. This 
may then lead to the child producing similar behavior as the model once they get to the 
location. The latter, stimulus enhancement, is very similar, but in this case the attention is 





particular object, gets interested in the object and may then figure out how to obtain the 
desired goal on his or her own.  
Perhaps the most cognitively simple form of imitation is mimicry. In mimicry the 
child replicates actions performed by a model, but no attention is paid to understanding 
the mechanisms involved in the task. The child copies the model's actions precisely, 
without any insights into why these actions are chosen or what the intended outcome is.  
The more complex forms of imitation encompass two behaviors, blind imitation 
and insightful imitation. In blind imitation the child is aware of the fact that the model's 
actions serve to achieve a goal. The child reproduces the actions and knows that they are 
crucial in achieving the goal, but is unaware of how each individual actions contributes to 
the goal. Insightful imitation takes this one step further: The child replicates the actions 
and the goal of a model and is also aware of how each single action contributes to the end 
result. 
While local and stimulus enhancement, as well as the ability to mimic, are 
certainly important to human learning, it is the use of the more complex blind and 
insightful imitation (and over imitation) that distinguish human imitation from the 
imitative behaviors of other animals. The next subsections thus cover the nature and role 
of social-cognitive abilities that are utilized in blind and insightful imitation, but not in 
enhancement and mimicry: intention reading and rationality judgments. 
 
1.2 THE ROLE OF INTENTION READING IN IMITATION 
Early evidence for imitation that goes beyond reflexive behavior, that is, blind 
imitation or insightful imitation, comes from Meltzoff (1995). He used a behavioral re-





In the experimental condition the model attempted to perform an action, but failed and 
thus never reached the end state. While it was easy for adults to figure out the model's 
intention and thus infer the model's desired end goal, the question was whether young 
children would reproduce the intended outcome or simply replicate the exact bodily 
motions, that is, display mimicry. Producing the intended outcome would thus require 
intention reading and such behavior would be classified as (blind or insightful) imitation.  
Meltzoff tested children in four different conditions. In the first demonstration 
condition the adult performed actions on objects and actually reached the desired 
outcome. In a second demonstration condition the adult attempted to perform the actions, 
showed a desire to reach an end goal, but failed to achieve it. In a control condition the 
children were handed the objects without any prior demonstration. In a second control 
condition the experimenter handled the objects before giving them to the child, but 
refrained from performing any of the actions in question. This condition served to explore 
whether the children observing the adult handle the objects in general would lead to them 
spontaneously performing the target actions. 
The results showed that whether the model actually achieved the end goal or tried 
to and failed had no impact on the children's rate of production of the end goal. Thus 
children were able to estimate the model’s intended goal via intention reading. The 
behavior shown in this study is thus imitation. The design, however, does not warrant 
saying whether the imitation was blind or insightful. Last, the rate of production of the 
end goal was significantly higher in the demonstration conditions than in control 
conditions with no demonstration, meaning that children produced those actions, because 





Following up on the findings of Meltzoff (1995), Carpenter, Akhtar and 
Tomasello (1998) found that 16 month olds reproduce intended actions more often than 
accidental actions – that is, imitate selectively based on the model’s intentions. An adult 
model performed two neutral-looking actions on an apparatus, one of which was verbally 
marked as intentional (“There!”), while the other was verbally marked as accidental 
(“Whoops!”). The child participants did not mimic the adult’s bodily motions, which 
were the same in both cases, but selectively imitated those actions that the model 
performed intentionally with a greater frequency. 
In addition to showing the central role of intention reading for imitation, studies 
have also found that children take into account the means that the model has at his 
disposal in the context of the action. Like intention reading, the use of this skill sets 
imitation apart from rote copying and makes it a more efficient learning mechanism. The 
next subsection gives a brief overview of the literature on rational imitation. 
 
1.3 RATIONAL IMITATION 
In a study by Gergely, Bekkering and Király (2002) fourteen-month-old infants 
(see Schwier, Van Maaren, Carpenter and Tomasello, 2006 for a replication of the study 
with twelve month olds) saw a model turn on a light by pushing the switch with his or her 
head. In one condition, the adult was apparently cold and held a blanket in his or her 
hands, such that the more efficient alternative way to turn on the light, that is, using his or 
her  hand, was not available. In the other condition the model’s hands were free, such that 
he or she could have used them to press the button to turn on the light. When it was their 





which the model’s hands were free. The reasoning is that in the first condition children 
were aware that the model could not use his or her hands, since they were occupied with 
holding the blanket. In the second condition, however, the model had his or her hands 
free and thus could have used them to turn on the light. Because he or she did not choose 
that more efficient alternative, it might be inferred that there must have been a specific 
reason for him or her using the head. Hence these findings suggest that the use of an 
unconventional action, even when more efficient alternatives are available, highlights the 
model’s intentional use of that unconventional action.  
Children are thus not only able to read a model’s intentions, but also take into 
account the context of the performed action when performing the modeled action 
themselves. Imitation involving these two social-cognitive abilities is only found in 
humans. However there is another feature that sets human imitation apart from intention-
reading great apes – over imitation. This might be a significant factor in explaining why 
human culture is so highly evolved. The next section will explain what over imitation is 
by reviewing a set of studies on the phenomenon. The section after that will provide some 
thoughts on why humans over imitate and why over imitation could be the crucial factor 
for human culture’s uniqueness. 
 
1.4 OVER IMITATION 
Despite displaying sophisticated social-cognitive abilities in imitation behavior, 
participants in the above-mentioned studies also imitated redundant and accidental 
actions at a high rate. In the study by Carpenter, Akhtar and Tomasello (1998), the 
children imitated 39-45% of the actions marked as unintentional (depending on whether 





to as over imitation in the literature, has been the subject of numerous studies. Similar to 
how Carpenter et al. investigated differences in imitation rate contingent on whether an 
action was intentional or accidental, a variety of studies explored the effects of necessary 
and redundant actions on faithfulness of imitation. While these studies unanimously find 
that necessary actions are imitated at a higher rate than redundant actions, participants 
still imitate the redundant actions at a high rate. 
Horner and Whiten (2005) investigated this. They used a medium-sized plastic 
box with a hole on the topside that was protected by a bolt, such that removal of the bolt 
would expose the hole. The front of the box contained another hole that was protected by 
a door and two small bolts. A reward was placed in a plastic tube connected to the hole 
on the inside of the box. An adult model then used a stick to perform a series of actions 
(e.g., tapping the bolts, inserting the stick into the top hole) on the box that were 
irrelevant to retrieving the reward, before opening the front door and obtaining the 
reward. Both three and four year olds faithfully imitated the irrelevant actions. Since the 
box was opaque, the children may not have been aware that some of the actions did not at 
all contribute to obtaining the reward. However, this explanation cannot be correct, since 
their behavior did not change when a similar transparent box was used. When it was 
obvious that most of the experimenter’s actions did not contribute to opening the box and 
retrieving the reward, children still displayed a high fidelity in imitating actions that were 
causally irrelevant to obtaining the reward. 
McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn and Horner (2007) conducted a similar study with five 
year-olds. A possible prediction is that the older children’s heightened causal awareness 
would lead to lower imitation rates in the transparent box condition, since children would 





experimenter. Nonetheless the pattern of results for five year-olds is similar to that of 
younger children. Actually, in both the opaque and the transparent box condition, 
participants displayed an even higher degree of imitation. This trajectory continues into 
adulthood, such that adults display even greater rates of imitation (McGuigan, Makinson 
and Whiten, 2011). A similar pattern was found Reader, Bruce and Rebers (2008), who 
used a different paradigm. They had an experimenter lead the participant out of a room. 
The experimenter chose an obviously longer route. After that they asked the participant to 
retrieve a person from the room. When they did so, the participants chose the longer route 
that the experimenter demonstrated to them instead of a shorter alternative. 
At first these findings might be surprising, since their heightened causal 
understanding should have helped older children and adults in particular to omit 
irrelevant actions and display more goal-oriented behavior (Want and Harris, 2002). 
However, looking back at the findings reported in Gergely, Bekkering and Király (2002), 
where children may have attributed the use of a seemingly more complicated and less 
efficient action in favor of a more efficient alternative, might help us account for these 
results. Gergely et al. attributed children’s behavior to their awareness of the model’s 
intentions; we could apply a similar explanation here: Participants might be aware of the 
fact that the irrelevant actions performed by the adult model do not causally contribute to 
retrieving the reward from the box. However, this just highlights that, even though they 
might seem pointless, these actions are intentionally performed by the model. Hence for 
five year-olds, who have a higher causal awareness, the model’s intentions will be even 
clearer, resulting in an increasing rate of over imitation in older age groups. This 
explanation is supported by McGuigan and Whiten (2009). Testing very young children 





sophisticated yet, they found that their participants used an emulative rather than 
imitative strategy, performing only the causally necessary actions. 
 
1.5 WHY DO HUMANS OVER IMITATE? 
Because over imitation is basically described as the imitation of actions that are 
irrelevant to an overall goal, one might think of the human tendency to over imitate as an 
obstacle that delays humans in understanding and performing actions. However, if we 
consider the nature of cultural norms that are essential to being part of human societies, it 
is plausible that over imitation is not only conducive, but also necessary to developing, 
maintaining and transmitting complex cultural conventions. 
Cultural practices often contain steps whose impact on the result is not clearly 
visible for the members of the respective culture. Take cooking a meal by following a 
recipe as an example: The person who cooks the meal is often aware of the desired 
outcome (How the meal is supposed to look or taste), but unaware of the effect of each 
step or ingredient on said outcome (e.g., adding certain spices, adding yeast when making 
bread). When the cook reproduces all the steps in the recipe faithfully, he or she will 
produce the desired outcome, without having a sophisticated understanding of each 
component. The same is true for the faithful replication of verbal material, for example, 
when buying things. When the above-mentioned cook buys certain ingredients for his 
meal, using the exact terminology stated in the recipe will result in the vendor selling him 
the correct ingredients. Again, the cook does not need to know the precise meaning of 
each part (e.g., scaloppini veal) of his request, to successfully obtain the required items. 





imitator to invest large amounts of energy and time that would be required to thoroughly 
understand each step of the action or utterance.  
Current research on over imitation supports the above-described idea that over 
imitation plays a crucial rule in developing, maintaining and transmitting complex 
cultural conventions (Nielsen, 2012). Studies found that (at least in western children) 
over imitation extends robustly to other objects similar to that on which the 
demonstration had been performed (Nielsen, Mushin, Tomaselli and Whiten, 2014); and 
that children over imitate indirectly, that is, they imitate seemingly unnecessary actions 
demonstrated by an adult model to another adult (Nielsen, Moore, Mohamedally, 2012). 
Further, children have been found to prefer copying adults (Flynn and Smith, 2015), 
allowing for knowledge to be passed on from one generation to the next. Thus the current 
state of the field suggests that over imitation indeed seems to be a strong tool for cultural 
evolution and transmission. 
 
1.6 OVER IMITATION ACROSS CULTURES 
As alluded to in the previous section, over imitation is plausibly a mechanism that 
any human culture, whether it be a western industrialized society or an indigenous 
community, can profit from. Combined with its ability to enable and facilitate cultural 
transmission, it is not surprising that over imitation has been found in different cultures. 
Nielsen and Tomaselli (2010) conducted a series of experiments similar to those of 
Horner and Whiten (2005) on Bushman1 children from the Kalahari desert in south-west 
Africa: using three different apparatus that were adapted to fit in with the culture of the 
                                                






participants, Nielson and Tomaselli observed robust over imitation, which again 
increased with age. Hence their data support the notion that the findings of Horner and 
Whiten, as well as McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn and Horner might be universal across 
cultures (however, see Berl and Hewlett, 2015, for a striking exception). In addition to 
being possibly culturally universal, over imitation, in its strongest form, where the learner 
imitates even obviously irrelevant actions, is only found in humans. When comparing 
their human participants to a group of chimpanzees, Horner and Whiten (2005) found that 
the chimps display moderate over imitation in the opaque box condition, where it is 
relatively unclear whether the additional actions contributed to the goal, but none at all in 
the transparent box condition. Humans, by contrast, displayed strong over imitation in 
both cases. Over imitation is thus not only observed across different human cultures, but 
also exclusively found in humans, supporting the theory that it is an important factor to 
the complex culture that we as humans developed. 
 
1.7 OVER IMITATION TO FORM SOCIAL RELATIONS 
While in our examples of following a recipe (p. 24), faithful imitation has a 
concrete positive outcome (a tasty meal) for the imitator, the benefits of other cultural 
practices are often dependent on being part of a community and are also less direct. 
Adhering to traffic rules only bears a positive outcome if there are other drivers. 
Following rules of behavior during dinner leads to being accepted by the group. This 
bring us to another function of imitation. When imitating other people, even though it is 
not required, the imitation behavior may allow expression of affiliation to the model. In 
everyday-life this can be observed in people wearing certain clothes that are typical for a 





level, Lakin, Chartrand and Arkin (2008) argue that mimicry of motor functions is an 
affiliative response to social exclusion among adults. A study by Watson-Jones, Legare, 
Whitehouse and Clegg (2014) demonstrates this social function of imitation on a higher 
level and in children. Half of their child participants watched an animation that depicted a 
situation of ostracism: Three shapes interacted on the screen as a group, while a fourth 
shape attempted to join the group, but got rejected and eventually gave up. The other half 
of the participants watch an animation that depicted affiliation: Four shapes moved 
around the screen as a group. In a subsequent imitation task those children that had 
previously been primed for ostracism showed a greater degree of faithfulness in their 
imitation than those who had been primed for affiliation. Watson-Jones et al. argue that 
this difference is due to the children’s need to seek affiliation when they encounter a 
situation of ostracism and the lack of that need when the situation already suggests 
inclusion – when children sense the need to establish affiliation, they use faithful 
imitation to do so.  
Nielsen, Simcock and Jenkins (2008) compared a child's interaction with a live 
experimenter to that with a videotaped familiar experimenter and a videotaped unfamiliar 
experimenter. The model grabbed a box, and used a stick to release a switch and retrieved 
the contents of the box. Using the stick was less efficient than just using one’s hands. 
After three demonstrations it was the child's turn. Children in the live condition were 
more likely to copy the model's ineffective way of opening the box with a stick.  In the 
video conditions, where the opportunity for spontaneous contingent interaction was 
removed, the inefficient actions were copied less often. Copying of efficient actions was 





on the results. These findings were corroborated by a similar study by Marsh, Ropar and 
Hamilton (2014). 
One explanation for why the children may have been less likely to copy 
ineffective actions when seen on video is that they could have inferred that videotaped 
demonstrations do not provide socially relevant information to their current 
circumstances (Troseth, Saylor and Archer, 2006). If this had been the case, children 
should imitate a model seen on TV, as long as there is evidence that the information 
provided by the model is relevant to the here-and-now. In a second experiment Nielsen et 
al. had one condition in which the model interacted socially with the child via CCTV and 
a control in which no interaction took place. In the no interaction condition the children 
watched a video of the experimenter and the previous participant in the interactive 
condition. To control for potential effects produced by mentioning the other child's name, 
a third baseline, non-interactive condition was included. In this condition the children 
watched a pre-recorded video of a similar interaction without the use of any personal 
names. 
Children copied the model's inefficient action more often in the interactive 
condition. There was no difference between the two non-interactive conditions. 
Furthermore the children in the interactive condition performed no differently from those 
in the live condition of the first experiment. There was no significant difference in the 
copying of outcome-relevant actions, that is, opening the box. These results thus show 
that social interaction with the model increases the rate of imitation of infelicitous 
actions. This supports the theory that imitation serves as a way for the child to show and 






1.8 OVER IMITATION AND ACQUIRING CAUSAL INFORMATION 
The proposal that the main use of over imitation, beyond cultural transmission, 
lies in establishing social affiliation is not undisputed.  Lyons, Young and Keil (2007) 
argue that over imitation occurs not primarily for social reasons, but as a mechanism to 
acquire causal information about the observed actions and objects. This information is 
there even when the actions are not relevant to the goal of the task. If this hypothesis is 
true, children should imitate actions even when they are informed of the irrelevance of 
those actions for the task at hand. Lyons et al. investigated this possibility in a series of 
studies. 
In their first study, in the warm-up the model retrieved an object from a container 
and performed a series of irrelevant actions in the process. Participants were asked which 
of the actions had to be done and which were "silly". They were subsequently praised for 
identifying irrelevant actions. In the experimental phase a comparable “puzzle-box” was 
presented and the child was asked if he or she remembered the box from the training 
phase, because the box they currently had was just like it and also had a toy inside. Then 
the experimenter retrieved the toy. The box was reset and the experimenter left the room 
telling the child that he or she could get the toy and could do so "however they wanted". 
Despite the training phase and observing the model as being unreliable (in the sense that 
he or she kept performing irrelevant actions) over imitation was found. A control group 
that retrieved the toy from the box with no prior demonstration did not display much 
imitation of the irrelevant actions. Over imitation was also not correlated with the 
children's ability to identify irrelevant actions in the training phase. In some cases 
children, in addition to imitating the adult's inefficient use of an irrelevant mechanism, 





pulling a bolt out, rather than pushing it) because it was easier. The results suggest that, at 
least on a broader level, children infer causal significance from observed actions. 
If this is the case, then over imitation should persist even outside of the context of 
the experiment. To test this, Lyons et al. did a follow-up experiment. After the child had 
finished the first experiment he or she received a small gift and were told that the study 
was over. Then the experimenter told them that the next participant was going to arrive 
soon and that the research assistant had a habit of forgetting to put the toys back into the 
puzzle-boxes. The child was then asked to help check whether the toys were in the boxes 
and was left alone to do so. Despite taking away any pressure to over imitate that may 
have arisen from the experimental context, children's over imitation remained robust. 
A stronger form of the causal-inference hypothesis of over imitation would 
predict that children would even imitate unnecessary actions when explicitly told to omit 
them. This manipulation did not do away with over imitation. Lyons et al. conducted 
another experiment that set out to rule out the possibility that children could have 
imitated the irrelevant actions as kind of a social game (in line with the opposing view 
that over imitation is mainly social in nature). If causal inference causes over imitation, 
children should be less likely to imitate actions that are devoid of any causal relation to 
an end goal. This study showed that children who saw irrelevant actions in which the 
contact principle was violated showed less over imitation than a control that observed the 
same actions without any violation of the contact principle. 
Thus the findings by Lyons et al. provide support for the hypothesis that children 
over imitate because they attribute superior knowledge and expertise to the adults and can 





claims by Lyons et al. are, however, not unchallenged. Nielsen and Blank (2011) contest 
the findings of Lyons et al. and argue in favor of the social-affiliation hypothesis.  
To test these two hypotheses Nielsen and Blank devised a study in which a child 
saw two adults retrieve a toy from a novel box-like apparatus. One model used only 
causally relevant actions. The other model also included irrelevant actions. After both 
adults demonstrated, one of them left the room and the other one handed the apparatus 
over to the child. In one condition the adult who performed only causally relevant actions 
stayed in the room, in the other condition the adult who performed irrelevant actions 
stayed in the room. Thus in both conditions the children saw that the toy could be 
retrieved without the irrelevant actions, making which experimenter stayed and gave 
them the apparatus the only difference between conditions. If the desire to indicate social 
affiliation causes the child to copy irrelevant actions, one would expect them to omit 
irrelevant actions only when the model that performed them left the room. To explore this 
further Nielsen and Blank added a third condition in which both experimenters performed 
the irrelevant actions. Thus they gave the child no cues on the bases of which it could 
omit these actions. If causal understanding were the main factor in faithful imitation 
children should replicate the irrelevant actions only in this condition. Children omitted 
the irrelevant actions only when the efficient model stayed in the room. This supports the 
hypothesis that it is the need for social affiliation that drives faithful imitation. Children 
in the irrelevant-adult-stays condition reproduced the irrelevant actions just as often as 
children who saw those actions modeled by both adults. This supports the notion that 
faithful imitation not only plays a role in the transmission of culture, but also servers as a 





Kenward, Karlsson and Persson (2011) also challenge the causal-inference 
hypothesis put forward by Lyons et al., but do so on different grounds. They argue that 
instead of inferring that an unnecessary action is causally necessary for the goal, the 
children could have inferred the action to be a precautionary measure that is important to 
the goal, but does not produce the goal itself. Further they challenge the validity of Lyons 
et al.’s claim that the apparatuses used were causally transparent.  Even if they were, 
according to Kenward et al., this does not guarantee full causal understanding by the 
child. The produced behavior could thus be due to goal-directed exploratory manipulation 
without full causal understanding. Kenward et al. put forward a new hypothesis that over 
imitation is related to norms and their social acquisition by children. Their experiments 
had children verbally justify their over imitation. Before their main experiment Kenward 
et al. tried to establish whether children encode unnecessary actions as related to the end 
goal or more generally associate them with the apparatus they are demonstrated on. To 
test this, a model retrieved two different objects from the same apparatus and paired an 
unnecessary action with the retrieval of only one of the objects. Children imitated the 
unnecessary actions more frequently when retrieving the object that it was paired with, 
supporting the hypothesis that they associate the irrelevant action with the end goal 
(retrieving that particular object) instead of the apparatus in general. 
A second experiment was undertaken to determine what form the association 
takes. Children were again asked to retrieve the object associated with the unnecessary 
action. In some cases the action had already been performed (a dial had been turned). If 
children had a declarative belief that the dial needed to be turned before retrieving the 
object, they would be more likely to omit it, when it had already been done. If they 





frequency of dial turns should be similar or potentially higher due to local reinforcement. 
The results support the declarative belief hypothesis. When the dial had already been 
turned, no child turned it again, but when it had not been turned, the majority of children 
performed the irrelevant action. The ambiguity remains that children could have learned 
an implicit rule that the dial needs to be turned before getting the object, but not 
necessarily by the same person. 
This possibility was explored in a third experiment. To do so Kenward et al. asked 
the children about why an action had to be performed after the demonstration by the 
model, but before it was the child's turn. The hypothesis by Lyons et al. predicts a causal 
justification of even the unnecessary actions, while the unspecified purpose hypothesis 
that Kenward et al. argued for does not. In a second question children were asked if the 
object could be retrieved without performing the action. According to Lyons et al.’s 
hypothesis children should answer 'no' for each action. If they answered 'yes' for the 
relevant action and 'no' for the irrelevant action this would support Kenward et al.’s 
hypothesis. A further purpose of this experiment was to test if the unnecessary action was 
more likely to be encoded as relevant when the causal structure of the apparatus is less 
obvious. Hence a more complex apparatus was added to the procedure. On top of the 
questions described above children were also asked ‘What will you do to get out the 
marble?' and 'Will you perform the unnecessary/necessary action?’ Most children stated 
that they would perform the necessary action and the majority also stated that they would 
perform the unnecessary action. When asked about the cause, the necessary action was 
related to retrieving the marble much more often. Most children also stated that the 
marble could not be retrieved without the necessary action, but fewer said that it could 





a prescriptive norm that unnecessary actions should be performed in the context of the 
task, rather than that they infer that a unnecessary action is causally relevant as suggested 
by Lyons et al.   
 
1.10 CONCLUSION ON INSTRUMENTAL IMITATION 
This section covered the imitation of instrumental actions. It started with a 
discussion of the terminology used to describe imitative behavior. The crucial distinction 
here is between simple social learning behaviors (local enhancement, stimulus 
enhancement and mimicry) on the one hand and more complex imitation behaviors (blind 
imitation and insightful imitation) on the other hand. The latter involve the use of 
complex social-cognitive abilities. The section then proceeded to review studies that 
show the role that intention reading and rationality judgments play in instrumental 
imitation, before moving on to over imitation. This tendency to imitate accidental and 
irrelevant actions at a relatively high rate is unique to humans. Various scientists have 
been conducting experiments to determine the causes for over imitation. This section 
covered the literature on the social function of over imitation and the literature on its 
ability to facilitate the understanding of causal relationships in depth. A third strain of 
research that links over imitation to the acquisition and maintenance of normative and 
ritualistic behavior will be described in chapter 8. In conclusion, over imitation, which 
appears to be culturally universal, has the potential to be a major factor in passing on 
complex cultural conventions from one generation to the next – one imitates or learns a 
convention as a whole and only gradually begins to understand the role that each 





Chapter 2: Verbal Imitation 
Despite the large body of research on the imitation of actions, work on verbal 
imitation that goes beyond mimicry is scarce. Because language is a productive system, 
that is, a speaker can say something that has never been said or heard before, for imitation 
to be a useful learning mechanism in the acquisition of language, it has to be a more 
sophisticated process than just rote copying or mimicry.  If “imitation” is interpreted as a 
verbatim repetition of what one has heard before, then it cannot be useful in acquiring a 
productive system such as language. Hence, after providing a brief historical overview 
that helps explaining why imitation was originally not thought by all to be a good 
mechanism for learning language, this section proceeds to review studies that show that 
verbal imitation involves the same social-cognitive skills as imitation in the instrumental 
domain and to provide evidence for over imitation in the verbal domain. 
 
2.1 EARLY RESEARCH ON VERBAL IMITATION AND MIMICRY 
With the exception of researchers who have been investigating imitation from a 
low-level, learning-theoretic perspective (see Kymissis and Poulson, 1990 for an 
overview) the mainstream of earlier work in language acquisition has described the 
impact of imitation on language acquisition as restricted to early stages. As Snow (1981) 
reported, different researchers' verdicts on its role range from "an epiphenomenon of 
language acquisition that makes no contribution to development” (Ervin, 1964; Rodd and 
Braine, 1970) to accounts that give imitation at least partial credit for parts of children's 
language development, e.g., as supporting vocabulary acquisition (Rogdon and Kurdek, 





syntax in a small subset of children (Bloom, Hood and Lightbown, 1974; Moerk, 1977). 
The former accounts that completely rule out imitation as a mechanism in language 
acquisition base their argument on the large individual variance in imitation in children. 
They assume that only a subset of children learn language or parts of language via 
imitation. The latter accounts that attribute a small role in the acquisition of language to 
imitation base their assumption on the idea that children imitate syntactic structures when 
they are not yet able to produce them spontaneously.  A few accounts have regarded 
imitation as a mechanism that goes beyond mimicry and contributes significantly to 
children’s learning of language (Clark 1977; 1978; Moerk and Moerk 1979), but they 
support their claims with data from as few as two children.  
As with imitation in the instrumental domain, a problem with the investigation of 
imitation of language is that there are various different definitions of imitation based on 
how much of the original utterance is retained in the child's reproduction and on when the 
reproduction occurs temporally. Bloom et al. (1974) define imitation as an utterance 
which repeats part or all of a model's utterance, does not change the model's utterance 
except by reduction, and occurs within five utterances of the model's utterance. Ervin 
(1964) stated that verbal imitation is ‘an overt, immediate repetition of the model which 
shows no deviation from the model except reduction’. Folger and Chapman (1978) define 
it as the repetition of at least one content word of a model within the next conversational 
turn and within five utterances. Moerk (1977) defines it as an utterance that is wholly 
contained within that of the model, showing no deviation except from reduction or 
assimilation due to the child's own rules and occurring as the first utterance of the child 
after hearing the model's utterance. Moerk and Moerk (1979) define verbal imitation as 





and previously rare or absent in the child's speech. Ramer's (1976) definition describes it 
as an utterance in which the child produces all or part of an immediately preceding 
utterance by a model with no change except for deletions. Finally Rodgon and Kurdek 
(1977) describe it simply as complete or partial reproduction of the modeled utterance. 
Snow, in her 1981 study, distinguished among three types of imitation: Exact 
imitation, reduced imitation and expanded imitation. In exact imitation the child 
accurately reproduced the model's utterance given its phonological capabilities. Reduced 
imitation refers to reproductions that contain at least one content word of the model's 
utterance. Expanded imitation describes replications of at least one stressed content word 
found in the model's utterance plus one word or morpheme that was not in the original 
utterance. Snow studied a corpus that contained utterances from everyday interactions 
with one child from age 1;10 to 3;0. She compared each utterance to the two preceding 
utterances by the adult model in order to classify them according to the above-described 
categories of imitation. 
Snow found that almost 50% of the child's utterances fell into the three above-
mentioned categories of imitation (with the other half not falling into these categories and 
thus being classified as non-imitation). As the child grew older, a decrease in reduced 
imitation was observed, while exact imitation increased. This was attributed to the fact 
that when the child grew older he or she was able to fully imitate utterances that 
previously could only be replicated partially due to short-term memory limitations. 
Finally, with increasing age Snow found an increase in expanded imitation. The child 
would more often incorporate imitated chunks creatively to form adjective-adjective and 
noun-noun combinations, wh-questions and attempts at complex syntactic constructions. 





research, imitation does not just play a fringe role in language acquisition, but might be a 
central process in children's syntactic development as well as in their vocabulary 
acquisition.  
 
2.2 MODERN RESEARCH ON (NON-MIMICRY) VERBAL IMITATION 
Despite the work of Snow and others (see Speidel and Nelson, 1990 for a 
collection of relevant articles), it still took almost two decades until a new generation of 
scientists started revisiting imitation and the potentially major role it plays in language 
acquisition. To date studies investigating verbal imitation as a central learning 
mechanism in language acquisition are still scarce. The first studies on the subject, Over 
and Gattis (2010) and Bannard, Klinger and Tomasello (2013), investigate whether 
verbal imitation goes beyond mimicry and thus is actual (blind or insightful) imitation per 
the definition given in the initial section. Both studies investigate whether children use 
similar social-cognitive abilities in verbal imitation as in imitation in the instrumental 
domain.  
In their study, Over and Gattis (2010) explored whether in verbal imitation 
children imitate correct utterances with greater accuracy than ungrammatical ones, 
analogous to them imitating intentional actions at a higher rate than accidental ones (see 
Carpenter, Akhtar and Tomasello, 1998) and 'fixing' failed attempts by reproducing the 
intended outcome of a model's action rather than exact bodily motions (Meltzoff, 1995).  
Over and Gattis (2010) asked the child to "Say what I say" and uttered sentences 
with ungrammatical repetition (experimental condition) and grammatical sentences 
(control). Children turned out to show a greater rate of exact copying when the sentence 





interpretation of these data is that children are guided in their correction of 
ungrammatical sentences by the intention that they infer from the model. A simple 
alternative explanation would be that they did not actually correct the ungrammatical 
sentences but simply did not notice the repetitions. 
In a second experiment, Over and Gattis had three-year olds imitate sentences 
with either grammatical or ungrammatical repetitions. If children failed to recognize the 
repetitions they would omit them from both grammatical and ungrammatical sentences. If 
they corrected ungrammatical sentences, they should omit repetitions more frequently 
when they are ungrammatical. The children behaved in line with the latter hypothesis, 
imitating grammatical repetitions more frequently than ungrammatical ones.  
It is possible that children's tendency to correct ungrammatical sentences is not 
entirely due to their grammatical knowledge, but also based on their preference for 
copying the perceived intention behind an utterance. To further explore whether the 
children's verbal imitation behavior is guided by their perceived intention of the model, a 
third experiment was undertaken. Here Over and Gattis compared children's imitation of 
ungrammatical sentences by an apparently intentional agent to the imitation of the same 
sentences by an apparently unintentional model. Perceived intentionality was varied by 
using objects as models that either had a face (a plush frog) or no face (a box) and by 
whether they would engage in contingent social interaction with the child (the frog did 
this, the box did not). Children were significantly more likely to exactly replicate the 
box's utterances than those of the intentional agent. Analogously they were more likely to 
correct the intentional agent's sentences than those of the box. The findings of Over and 





utterances of a model and that perceived intentionality plays a key role in the verbal 
imitation. 
Bannard, Klinger and Tomasello (2013) investigated, among other factors, the 
role of intention reading in verbal imitation. In a series of studies on German 
monolingual children, Bannard, Klinger and Tomasello (2013) explored when three year 
olds would imitate novel words in utterances produced by adult speakers. In one study we 
investigated whether children would take into account the adult speaker’s intentions 
when imitating an utterance. In a game where it was their goal to obtain the same objects, 
child and experimenter took turns in requesting objects presented by a game master. The 
experimenter always went first and always preceded the object’s familiar label with a 
novel adjective (e.g., "Could you please give me the dilsige duck"). We found that 
children were less likely to reproduce a redundant adjective when the speaker indicated 
gesturally that he did not intend to produce it than when it was produced intentionally. 
These results are in line with Carpenter, Akhtar and Tomasello’s (1998) findings that 
children imitate instrumental actions that are intentional more often than those that are 
accidental and that children also show a higher rate of imitation for intentionally 
produced verbal material than for accidentally produced verbal material. This adds 
support to the notion that, as with their imitation of instrumental actions, children appear 
to make use of intention reading in their verbal imitation. 
In another experiment Bannard, Klinger and Tomasello explored whether children 
would take the functional context of an utterance into account when imitating a speaker. 
Here again, experimenter and child would request objects from a game master (e.g., 
"Could you please give me the dilsige duck"). Instead of marking the adjective as 





context, that is, the objects presented by the game master. Bannard, Klinger and 
Tomasello found that children imitated the novel adjective selectively. They imitated it 
with significantly higher frequency when the game master presented two different 
instances of the same object (e.g., a plain plastic flower and a plastic flower covered with 
stickers), making the adjective necessary to distinguish between the two, than in a control 
where the game master presented only a single plain object (e.g., plain plastic flower 
only), rendering the novel word redundant. These results suggest that, in addition to 
intention reading, children also take into account the functional context of an utterance to 
determine which words need to be imitated and which can be omitted.  
Despite some similarities, this study differs significantly from Gergely et al.’s 
work on rational imitation of instrumental action. Bannard, Klinger and Tomasello’s one 
object condition does not require the adjective to identify the referent and is thus 
somewhat analogous to Gergely et al.’s hands free condition – additional verbal material 
is not required by the context of the utterance. In the two-object condition, context 
justifies the experimenter’s use of the novel adjective; it is necessary to unambiguously 
identify the referent. The experimenter is therefore in a sort of a verbal hands tied 
condition. However, the child is also presented with two objects. Thus, the context of the 
child’s utterance also requires the adjective and therefore puts the child into a verbal 
hands tied condition as well. This becomes particularly relevant with respect to the order 
effects (increasing imitation in the one object condition in later turns) that Bannard et al. 
found in addition to the greater imitation in the two-object condition. The result seems to 
reveal two separable effects. First, context – the presence of an additional object in the 
two object condition – requires an adjective and thus increases imitation compared to the 





object condition, where it is not required by the context, reinforces their intentionality in 
producing it, similar to how the experimenter’s use of the unusual head push highlighted 
his intentionality in Gergely et al.’s study, producing the above-mentioned increase of 
imitation in later one object trials. 
Similar to work on the imitation of instrumental actions, the studies of imitation in 
the verbal domain found consistent patterns of over imitation. In the study that tested 
whether children would differentially imitate intentional versus accidental parts of an 
utterance, they still imitated the novel word at around 52% when it was gesturally marked 
as a slip-of-the-tongue (versus 70% in a control without such marking). In the study that 
tested whether children would take into account the relevance of a novel word within the 
functional context of the utterance, 56% of the participants imitated the novel word when 
it was redundant (versus 81% when it was required by the context).  
Thus, in those cases when the novel word was redundant within the functional 
context of the utterance or even marked as accidental, children still imitated it more than 
50% of the time. Therefore, the findings from Bannard, Klinger and Tomasello provide 
evidence that in the imitation of verbal material, children use the same social-cognitive 
skills (intention reading, rationality judgments) and display over imitation, as they do in 
the learning of instrumental actions. 
 
2.3 OVER IMITATION IN THE VERBAL DOMAIN 
Similar to their behavior in instrumental imitation tasks, humans over imitate in 
verbal tasks. This verbal over imitation might have purposes that are similar to those of 
over imitation in the instrumental domain: Language is a human cultural convention and 





individual to another and also allows humans to engage in that convention, that is, 
communicate with one another, even when not every single part of an utterance is 
understood. When, for instance, a cook buys ingredients for a meal, using the exact 
terminology stated in the recipe will result in the vendor selling him the correct 
ingredients. The cook does not need to know the precise meaning of each part (e.g., 
scaloppini veal) of his request, to successfully obtain the required items.  
There is also evidence that suggests that verbal (over) imitation, like its 
instrumental counter part, may serve to establish affiliation with others. Branigan, 
Pickering and Cleland (2000) report that in a joint picture description task, a participant 
adopted the experimenter’s syntactic constructions in his or her dialogues. Similar effects 
have been shown by Garrod and Anderson (1987), Garrod and Clark (1993) and Garrod 
and Doherty (1994) on the word level: when describing abstract mazes,  either in terms of 
paths between two points, or as column-row indices, participants adopted similar lexical 
descriptions. Although in the above-described studies a distinction between imitation and 
over imitation does not apply, they suggest that imitation of language can serve a social 
purpose. It then follows that the imitation of verbal material that is not necessary in the 
context of solving a task, e.g., as seen in Bannard, Klinger and Tomasello (2013), where 
children imitated unnecessary adjectives at a high rate, could partially serve to establish 
social affiliation. 
While over imitating people we interact with allows for establishing affiliation, 
like it does in the instrumental domain, it has an additional purpose that is unique to the 
verbal domain: facilitating communication. When interlocutors use similar syntax and 
especially similar vocabulary, that is, form referential pacts (Matthews, Lieven and 






2.4 CONCLUSION ON VERBAL IMITATION 
The current section gave a historical overview of research on verbal imitation and 
then reviewed recent studies that show that imitation in the verbal domain involves 
social-cognitive abilities such as intention reading and rationality judgments of the 
context of an utterance. Given that it is a much more complex process than rote copying, 
we can assume that imitation might play a major role in language acquisition. 
Additionally the studies reviewed in this section found that humans imitate more verbal 
material than necessary – like in the instrumental domain, we over imitate when we 
imitate language. While it seems that imitation in the verbal and the instrumental domain 
are processes that make use of the same underlying cognitive abilities and they both 
display over imitation, no work has been undertaken on whether verbal imitation varies 
across cultures and languages. The present research aims to fill that gap. Hence the 
following sections provide a background on cultural differences in the world in general 
and between western and Chatino culture in particular with emphasis on child rearing. 
Thereafter referential expressions will be discussed. They are the type of expressions that 











Chapter 3: Ethnography and the Cross-cultural Perspective 
Cross-cultural work in child development, the present research being no 
exception, compares how differences between cultures can lead to differences in 
behavior. That means that in order to devise experimental studies that can make the 
effects of cultural differences visible, one needs to first understand where the investigated 
cultures lie along agreed upon dimensions. Then one identifies traits that have the 
potential to lead to developmental differences. This chapter first provides a general 
overview of characteristics along which cultures can be classified. Then child rearing, the 
cultural practice most relevant to the present work is discussed, before moving on to 
position Chatino culture in a cultural spectrum as a whole and with respect to child 
rearing practices. 
 
3.1 CLASSIFICATION OF CULTURES 
In the past a common way of classifying cultural groups around the world was by 
using the Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft continuum first proposed by Tönnies (1887, 1957). 
A Gesellschaft (German for society) is a society that is large in scale, urban, has a 
complex system of differentiated economic roles, complex technology, internal 
heterogeneity and regular contact with the outside world. The individuals in a 
Gesellschaft are educated in a complex school system and are wealthy through commerce 
and the accumulation of money and goods. Their social relations are mostly fleeting and 
with independent strangers. Gesellschaften can be found in most of the western world, 





The Gesellschaft prototype contrasts with Gemeinschaft. A Gemeinschaft 
(German for community) in general has opposite attributes than the Gesellschaft. It is 
typically a rural, small-scale community with minimal division of labor, as most people 
work on the surrounding fields. They use mostly simple technology and have only basic 
education. A community is self-contained with limited interaction with the outside world. 
Its economy is defined by subsidence activities and people have a lower income than in a 
Gesellschaft. Their social relationships are interdependent with kin and are long lasting. 
Although this way of classifying cultures is still used in some modern-day research (e.g., 
Greenfield, 2009), it has elsewhere received criticism (Brint, 2001). One significant 
obstacle is that the binary extremes it relies on are hardly found in today’s world. While 
most indigenous cultures have attributes of a Gemeinschaft, many aspects of these 
cultures do not fit that stereotype well, because they, for instance, have ample contact 
with the outside world, have access to technology and discovered ways of making a 
living apart from agriculture.  The same does also apply for cultures that are closer to the 
Gesellschaft prototype: Although most industrial Western cultures display many aspects 
of a Gesellschaft, there are differences in the degree to which state-of-the-art 
developments are available, in particular when it comes to modern infrastructure such as 
the internet and public transportation. In the present work, we use the terms Gesellschaft 
and Gemeinschaft as reference points, but still give a detailed account of the cultures 
investigated with respect to the parameters encompassed by the Gesellschaft-
Gemeinschaft scheme. 
Where a particular culture is positioned according to these parameters is 
correlated with the way children are raised in that culture (e.g., Lieven, 1994; Gaskins, 





development is nowadays undertaken are modern, industrialized, western societies, one 
can easily be under the impression that the way parents interact with children in the 
western industrialized world is universal across cultures. The following subsection 
describes how child rearing practices can be very different across cultures and, since a 
major part of the present research is concerned with the acquisition of language, it puts 
emphasis on how these differences could affect verbal development. 
 
3.2 AN OVERVIEW OF CHILD REARING PRACTICES ACROSS CULTURES 
Most of our knowledge of child development in general and language acquisition 
in particular is based on data from European language speakers, and predominantly the 
English-speaking middle-class. In that society parents coordinate and supervise their 
child’s activities. Mother and father spend great amounts of time in one-on-one 
interactions with the child. These interactions are child-centered and pedagogical in 
nature. Further parents talk to their child in a special, simplified and clearer way with a 
different tone of voice, called motherese or child-directed speech (Snow, 1972; Pine, 
1994; Lieven, 1994; Gaskins, 2000; Lancy, 2007). 
This focus on the western middle-class has long led to the assumption that the 
above-described child rearing practices might be the norm all around the world and might 
even be a requirement for healthy child development. Such an assumption has, however, 
also long been subject to critique (Wolfenstein 1955, Manson 1975, Lieven, 1994). 
Ethnographic research of a large sample of cultures shows, however, that western child 
rearing is quite the opposite of the norm, and that only very few societies in the world 





The only non-western cultures that display such child rearing with relative consistency 
are egalitarian foraging societies (Whiting and Pope-Edwards, 1988). Among them are 
the Yahgan of Tierra del Fuego, the Garo from Bengal, the Eipo of Western New Guinea 
and the Himba of Southwest Africa. In the cultures of the Trobriands, the Wogeo from 
Papua New Guinea, and the Rotuman from Fiji, mother and father participate in the 
child-centered activities as summarized in Lancy (2007). The rarity of western-like child 
rearing is supported further when taking into account that the above examples mostly 
discuss parent-infant interaction. For toddlers and older children, western-like parent-
child interaction is even less common (Parin, 1963) 
In many non-western cultures, children are not primarily raised by their parents, 
but by their peers. It is also their (older) peers from whom they receive much of the 
maintenance support they need. Weisner and Gallimore (1977) found that in a sample of 
almost 200 cultures, 40 percent of infants and 80 percent of toddlers were taken care of 
by older siblings rather than their mother or father. Parents do not monitor their children 
or structure their experiences. They only provide what help is actually needed. Children 
do sometimes partake in adult work, but the goal of this is not so much to motivate the 
children at the cutting edge of their abilities, but rather to help the parents with those 
processes that they are competent at. When no help is needed, children are expected to 
find something to do with their peers or on their own. In general children are expected to 
be more independent than in western cultures, parents provide social orientation rather 
than interaction and believe that child development is a process that happens by itself 






In terms of child-directed speech, in non-western cultures, children are often not 
directly addressed by adults, although it has been suggested that special forms of speech 
that are meant for children exist in such cultures, albeit that these are all very different 
from motherese. For example, some cases parents speak for their children, by lifting them 
up and speaking in a high-pitched voice (Schieffelin, 1985), or they address them 
directly, but not with the goal of fostering communication, but rather to quiet the child by 
using a “lowered voice, monotonic, ‘crooning’ speech”, as Pye (1986) describes Quiche 
Mayan mothers. Instead of being addressed by their parents, it is common for non-
western children to receive orders and warnings from their older peers, telling or 
forbidding them to do something. Although this controlling language is more terse than 
what children hear in dyadic interactions with their caregivers, commands and 
interdictions have a very transparent relation to the child and the immediate situation and 
might thus provide the child with a good amount of information (Lieven, 1994). 
Studies indicate that cultural factors that contribute to the lower rate of parent-
child interaction common in most cultures are unassisted infant mortality (high infant 
mortality rate leads to less time and attachment invested in children), infanticide in order 
to conserve resources, the assumption that a quiet baby is a happy baby that leads to 
reduction of playful stimulating interaction, the belief that too much interaction can 
interfere with the child’s inborn character, parents working longer hours and generally 
larger numbers of children. A higher rate of parent-child interaction, on the other hand, is 
motivated by circumstances opposite to the ones described above. Further, the living 
conditions in contemporary western societies, that is, infants and toddlers living isolated 





sinking demand in child labor lead to an increase in parent-child interaction and 
supervision (Lancy, 1996; Trevarthen, 1983). 
In addition to the evidence suggesting that intensive parent-child interaction is 
mostly a western trait and not typical for the vast majority of cultures, there is further 
evidence suggesting its occurrence is also contingent on social class. Research suggests 
that it actually mostly occurs in the middle and upper classes of western societies, but 
much less in the lower classes and subcultures (Heath, 1983). In the United States of 
America, for example, ethnographers found a drastic reduction or absence of the middle-
class parent-child interaction described at the beginning of the section in lower class 
households (Ward, 1971; Heath, 1990). Similarly, a reduction or absence of motherese is 
found in the lower strata of society (Heath, 1983).  
Given that dyadic interaction between parent and child and motherese as found in 
western middle-class cultures is the exception rather than the rule, it appears that they are 
likely not a requirement for healthy child development, but might rather be a means to 
prepare children for success in academic settings and eventual participation in the 
information economy (Lancy, 2007). 
The present work sets out to compare verbal imitation behavior in western and 
Chatino culture. Hence the following section gives more detailed insights into the culture 
and child rearing of the Chatino community of Santa Lucia Teotepec, where parts of the 
experiments were conducted, as well as aspects of the Chatino language. 
 
3.3 THE CHATINO CULTURE OF SANTA LUCIA TEOTEPEC 
The Chatinos are an indigenous population that traditionally inhabited small parts 





Pacific coast. It has been argued that they occupied the lower Rio Verde Valley prior to 
the arrival of Mixtecs (Joyce, 2010). They are spread out across various small 
communities, one of which is Santa Lucía Teotepec, where part of the data for the present 
research was collected. Teotepec is a community in the southeastern part of the Chatino 
region at about 1200 meters above sea level. In 1957, Teotepec was divided by a violent 
massacre and subsequent civil war (Greenberg, 1989; McIntosh, 2015). These events 
caused half of the people of Teotepec to relocate and establish their own community 
Cerro del Aire, which, in turn, caused Teotepec to lose its municipal status. It is now part 
of Santos Reyes Nopala and currently has a population of 1400. 
The language spoken in Teotepec is Teotepec Chatino, a variety of Eastern 
Chatino, which is an Otomanguean language. Its default word order is VSO, it has a 
complex tone system and adjectives occur post-nominally and are an open class that 
covers a wide range of semantic features. Many speakers are also bilingual in Spanish. 
The language is endangered (see McIntosh, 2015 for more details).  
The economy of Teotepec is mainly based on agriculture (corn, beans, chilies, 
century plant, avocado, cotton, fruits, sugar cane and coffee) and raising cattle on a small 
scale. The work skills of the population are homogeneous, with most people being 
proficient at activities that are crucial in the community, such as building houses and 
working on the fields (Wauchope and Vogt, 1969; Greenberg, 1989; Rasch, 2002, 
McIntosh, 2015). Some of the men work as laborers in nearby towns such as Puerto 
Escondido and it is also not uncommon that men go to the United States for some years 
to work (McIntosh, 2015). As is common in Mesoamerican cultures, family relations play 
an important role that is also reflected in the topography of the community. Children are 





While there is very little literature on child rearing in Chatino communities or let 
alone Teotepec, the literature notes that aspects of Chatino culture are, with some 
variation, relatively similar to that of broader Mesoamerican culture, as Wauchope and 
Vogt (1969, p. 317) note: “All of the Indian groups of the southern Mexican highlands 
participated originally in the basic Middle American culture but varied widely in the 
degree of elaboration”. In the same vein, child rearing in Teotepec is, with some 
variation, comparable to other communities in Mesoamerica. In order to provide a 
background on child rearing in Teotepec, I will thus draw from the literature on child 
rearing in Mesoamerica and comment on it based on my experience in Teotepec when 
necessary. 
As mentioned in the previous sub-section, child rearing in Mesoamerica is very 
different from that in western cultures. From toddlerhood on, children are primarily cared 
for by older peers from their extended family - “Children are expected to care for 
younger children”, as Wauchope and Vogt’s (1969, p. 345) statement about Zapotec 
culture shows. They take part in adult activities, but the reason for this is not for them to 
have fun, but to help the adults. Parents believe that chores make children competent and 
motivated and children take pride in contributing to the household. In their free time they 
are expected to spent time with their peers or on their own and their play consist of 
manipulating objects and large motor play and often resembles adult activities: 
“…growing up is a period during which family work responsibilities are gradually 
acquired. Play partners in dispersed populations are usually relatives, and play activity is 
often child imitation of adult behavior. Girls become expert tortilla makers by the age of 
eight” (Wauchope and Vogt, 1969, p.357). Adults do not frequently engage in play and 





Woodward, 2015). Children receive little supervision from their parents (Parin, 1963; 
Ochs, 1985; Rogoff, Mistry, Güncü and Mosier, 1993; Gaskins, 2000, 2006; Wauchope 
and Vogt, 1969, p. 397). My experience in Teotepec allows me to confirm the points 
made by the literature. I observed young boys and girls do chores around the house and 
run small errands on a regular basis. Older children would also help with work on the 
fields. When there was no work to be done, children played with their peers in the 
neighborhood, without supervision from their parents. In general, if supervision was 
needed, it would come from older peers, rather than the parents. Most children over 3 
years of age that I tested during my time in Teotepec would show up to the experiments 
accompanied by older siblings. Apart from parents of older children who expressed 
interest in my research, only parents of three-year old children came to the field lab with 
their children.  
There is not much dyadic play, that is child-centered play between caregiver and 
child with a pedagogical focus, in Teotepec. This again reflects the general literature on 
Mesoamerican cultures. Sheidman, Gaskins and Woodward (2015) state that Mayan 
caregivers rarely directly address infants in a pedagogical way. That is, they rarely 
follow-in on the infants’ attentional focus or engage in object play (de Leon, 1998; 
Gaskins, 1999, 2006; Pye, 1986; Rogoff, 2003). Infants observe the examples of others 
performing actions instead (Gaskins, 1999; Gaskins and Paradise, 2010; Shneidman and 
Goldin-Meadow, 2012), such that observational learning is emphasized more than child-
directed teaching (Shneidman, Gaskins and Woodward, 2015). Further, Mesoamerican 
adults usually have less experience in settings of formal schooling than western adults 
(Rogoff, 2003). This is important, because such formal schooling makes adults assume a 





engaging in child-directed pedagogical behavior more frequently, as shown in recent 
research (Correa-Chavez and Rogoff, 2009). These findings support Wauchope and 
Vogt’s observation that Mesoamerican parents have less formal schooling. They report 
that for Chatinos “The greater part of the education is informal and consists of training 
the children for their adult duties” (p. 365). It follows that Mesoamerican parents, but 
also lower-class parents from western societies engage in less dyadic-play with their 
children than western middle and upper-class parents. Mesoamerican children thus 
receive much of their language input not from one-on-one interactions with their parents 
but from overhearing - Shneidman and Goldin-Meadow (2012) found 18-month old 
Mayan children hear nearly 60% of their total language input in overheard and not child-
directed speech, compared to 30% for infants from large families in the United States. 
Again, my experience in Teotepec confirms these statements about dyadic caregiver-
child interaction in Mesoamerican cultures. I saw children watch adults and older peers 
do work and at times they would receive orders. Such communication was, however, not 
child-centered as it is in western cultures. Also mothers carried infants around by 
strapping them to their own body while doing daily chores, as is common practice in 
other Mesoamerican cultures as well (de Leon, 2005, p.137 and Wauchope and Vogt, 
1969, p. 397, on Mixtecs: “The child spends most of its first two years wrapped in the 
folds of a rebozo, on a woman's or child's back, lying on a petate or in a wood or cloth 
cradle.”) 
But despite the close physical proximity, I observed very few dyadic interactions 
or child-centered communications. The only exception to this was the time shortly before 
and during dinner. The family that I stayed with would gather in the dining room and 





then engage in play with the smaller children. For roughly 30 to 45 minutes they would 
ask them questions, tease them and play with them and their toys. Albeit the Chatinos 
seem to spend much less time with their children in dyadic interactions, it has to be noted 
that the adult-child interaction that I observed in Teotepec was very cordial and 
respectful, while less controlling than in western cultures. What Gaskins (1996, 2006) 
eloquently stated matches my observations in Teotepec perfectly:  “… There is a matter-
of-fact assessment and acceptance of children for who they are and how they act. 
Development is not seen as requiring the construction of a special world of childhood; 
rather, it is seen as occurring within the world of ongoing work and other family 
activities.” 
The hypothesis of the present work is that such cultural differences in the amount 
of dyadic caregiver-child interaction lead to differences in verbal imitation behavior. A 
detailed argument of why we believe this could account for cross-cultural differences in 
verbal imitation, preceded by an overview of referring expressions will be presented in 






Chapter 4: Adjectives and Referring Expressions 
In this chapter referring expressions are described. We introduce a distinction 
between the contrastive and descriptive use of adjectives. We propose that cross-cultural 
differences in dyadic caregiver-child interaction affect use and exposure to adjectives and 
particularly lead to a difference in the relative experience with contrastive and descriptive 
uses, and discuss how this might lead to differences in verbal imitation behavior. 
 
4.1 CONTRASTIVE AND DESCRIPTIVE USE OF ADJECTIVES 
Adjectives are mainly used in two ways, the first being descriptive use. An 
adjective serves a descriptive function when it describes a property of an object that is 
already known to be the topic of conversation. The second use of adjectives is the 
contrastive function, whereby adjectives help to narrow down the space of potential 
referents for a reference. 
The term reference stands for the relation between a linguistic element and an 
entity in the world. A referring expression is thus the linguistic form used to denote an 
entity. It can present itself in various ways: as a modified noun phrase ("the little dog"), 
indefinite noun phrase ("a dog"), deictic expression ("there"), personal pronoun ("she") or 
even non-verbally as pointing or staring. When the referent is particularly salient and 
unambiguous, the referring expression only needs to contain minimal information (e.g., 
in a context where there is a single dog, it is sufficient to say "a dog"). When the referent 
is less accessible the referring expression needs to be more informative ("the big black 
dog"). One common way across languages to make referring expressions more 





expression increases the informativeness of the referring expression by narrowing down 
the space of potential referents of the reference. Talking about “the big black dog” rules 
out all dogs that are not big or black as potential referents. 
Because the primary function of language is communication, reference is central 
to language - the speaker needs to inform the listener what entity in the world (referent) 
he or she are talking about. Thus reference is a joint activity between speaker and 
listener. The speaker assesses the knowledge state of the listener and tailors his or her 
utterance accordingly in terms of informativeness and specificity. Context dependent use 
of referring expressions has been the subject of experimental studies. Ford and Olson 
(1975) investigated whether children's referring expressions reflect the context of an 
utterance. In their experiment, objects were presented in arrays such that, depending on 
the array, one, two or three critical features and the contrastive adjectives denoting them 
were required to identify the target. One child described which block covered a gold star 
to another child who then tried to find its location. The speaker could observe the 
performance of the listener. Their child participants (5.5 and 7.5 years old) formed 
different referring expressions when the same object was presented in different contexts. 
Information content of the referring expressions increased with the rising information 
demands of the task/array. 
While the study of Ford and Olson (1975) and others (e.g., Whitehurst, 1976) 
focused on the adaption of referring expressions contingent on the visual array they are 
presented in (how many distractors were present and how many features were needed to 
unambiguously specify the referent), Matthews, Lieven, Theakston and Tomasello (2006) 
investigated the effects of the state of information of the listener. In one study they 





referring expressions in children. They manipulated how much information the addressee 
had about the referent and whether the child was aware of the state of information of the 
addressee. They found that although two year-olds’ referring expressions did not vary 
with differently informed addressees, three and four year-olds’ referring expressions were 
more informative when the addressee had less information about the referent. This 
supports the notion that social-cognitive abilities such as theory-of-mind play a role in the 
construction of referring expressions. Older children who are more advanced in 
perspective taking are better able to tailor their utterances to the listeners’ demands than 
younger children. In a second experiment Matthews et al. report similar effects when 
manipulating whether the referent was mentioned in prior discourse. Even two year-olds 
were more informative when there was no previous discourse about the referent. 
In addition to the effects of visual context and the child's assessment of the state 
of knowledge of the listener, research suggests that the way in which caregivers use 
referring expressions has an impact on the child's use of referring expressions. This will 
be discussed in the next subsection. 
 
4.2 VARIANCE OF ADJECTIVE USE IN REFERRING EXPRESSIONS 
As previously established, reference is a social activity in which the speaker uses 
words to describe an entity and tailors his or words in a way that enables the listener to 
unambiguously identify the entity that is being referred to. Research has explored several 
factors in such interactions that could lead to a difference in the use of referring 
expressions in the learner. Whitehurst (1976) investigated how a model's ability to be 
informative and non-redundant in his or her use of reference would impact children's 





One hypothesis is that a child might learn to avoid producing insufficiently 
informative references due to their own frustrating experience with ambiguous messages. 
Conversely, the child might learn to add sufficiently informative or even redundant 
communication to their repertoire. The opposite prediction would be that a child will 
adopt an adult's poor style of reference, not taking into account the effects on him or her 
as a listener, either because he or she is unable to induce the structure of informative 
reference from incomplete examples or due to a general tendency to imitate (see chapter 
1). In one of Whitehurst's (1976) studies the child participants (4-9 years old) went 
through twenty-four listening trials, half of which occurred prior to the task and the other 
half in between experimental blocks. On those listening trials the experimenter described 
an object within an array and it was the child's task to point to the correct object. 
Participants were divided into a group that listened to sufficiently informative and non-
redundant references (i.e., references that contained contrastive adjectives that allowed 
the listener to unambiguously identify the referent), and another group that listened to an 
adult producing insufficiently informative references (using descriptive adjectives that do 
not add any information which would help in unambiguously identifying the referent). 
After the listening trials it was the child's turn to produce a referring expression to point 
out an object in an array to the adult. Whitehurst found that receiving insufficiently 
informative referring expressions in the listening trials led to a significantly lower amount 
of references (both informative and non-redundant) produced by the children in the 
production trials. Being exposed to a good model, producing informative, non-redundant 
referring expressions lead to a higher tendency for the children to produce references of 





formed referring expressions leads to a better understanding of reference that affects the 
child’s own production of referring expressions. 
In a similar way the experience that children have with the two different uses of 
adjectives, descriptive (describing a property of or an attitude towards an already 
identified referent; e.g., “look at that huge house”, “look at that ugly house” when there is 
only one house there) and contrastive (narrowing down the space of referents in a 
referring expression; e.g., “look at the huge house” when there are two houses, one of 
which is huge) could influence their own understanding of adjectives and reference. 
While the most discussed function of adjectives is the contrastive one (Dale and Reiter, 
1995), Karmiloff-Smith (1979) suggests that young children from a western culture, due 
to the dyadic caregiver-child interaction that they often participate in, learn the 
descriptive function of adjectives first. Karmiloff-Smith tested children from Geneva, 
Switzerland in an age range from 3 to 10 years. Her task involved 12 opaque bags that 
each contained four objects. Four bags contained four entirely different objects each. 
Four bags contained two different and two identical objects each. Finally, four bags 
contained two different objects and two similar objects with a different color each. The 
experimenter presented the child participant a bag and then asked the child to close his or 
her eyes. The experimenter then removed an object from the bag. The child was then 
allowed to look again and was asked ‘Which one did I hide?’ In the younger children 
(three and four years), Karmiloff-Smith found that their use of adjectives in their 
responses were not very discriminative with respect to whether the adjectives were 
descriptive or contrastive. Three year olds used a high number of adjectives to describe 
single objects, although they used adjectives more when they had to talk about an object 





the adjective was required as when it was not required. At five years and older, children 
showed a clear distinction between the two contexts, with much greater adjective use 
when the adjective was required. These results suggest that young western children (three 
and four years old) are mostly using adjectives in the descriptive function (they don’t take 
into account context and do not differentiate based on context). Older children are able to 
take into account context and use adjectives in their contrastive function. 
She explains these findings by the fact that western children, such as the ones 
from Geneva, Switzerland that she studied, spend a lot of time in dyadic caregiver-child 
interactions with a pedagogical focus. Since these interaction usually involve obvious and 
known referents, Karmiloff-Smith argues that they foster the understanding of descriptive 
adjectives. Western parents and children spend time together in a restricted environment 
(e.g., the play area in the living room) with the same referents being present each time. In 
these situations there is little ambiguity about what the referent central to the interaction 
is, such that adjectives in referring expressions serve the purpose of drawing attention to 
interesting properties of the referent and teaching the children new words. Hence children 
from western culture, who participate in a lot of dyadic interactions, first become familiar 
with the descriptive use of adjectives and then at five years of age start understanding the 
standard case, contrastive use of adjectives, and establishing reference. This would not 
happen to this extent in cultures where dyadic interactions between caregiver and child 






4.3 REFERENTIAL ADJECTIVE USE BY CHILDREN ACROSS CULTURES 
Karmiloff-Smith's findings suggest a hypothesis that, besides the default 
contrastive use of adjectives in reference, children from a western culture with ample 
amounts of dyadic interactions in the same environment, from an early age, have 
exposure to adjectives being used descriptively. They engage in frequent pedagogically 
focused dyadic interactions with their caregivers in the same environment (e.g. play 
room), talking about the same obvious referents over and over again and thus gain much 
experience with using descriptive adjectives in order to refer to already mutually salient 
properties of objects that are already known to them.  
As discussed in section 3.2, dyadic caregiver-child interaction in the same 
environment is very rare outside of the middle and upper classes of western culture. In 
many non-western cultures, including that of the Chatinos of Teotepec investigated in the 
present research, such dyadic caregiver-child interaction with a pedagogical focus is rare. 
Children spend time mostly among their peers and in a dynamic environment.  They are 
involved in adult work activities, but the focus does not lie on teaching the children, but 
rather on having them contribute to the household. Adults do not usually engage in play 
with the children and discourage it when it interferes with the household chores. Parents 
believe that children develop best when adults do not supervise their activities and plan 
their experiences in detail, as documented by Shneidman, Gaskins and Woodward 
(2015), Parin (1963) and Gaskins (2000, 2006). 
This means that, unlike western children, they do not encounter the same scenes 
and objects over and over again. The focus of communication is thus establishing 





through the contrastive use of adjectives (the green house, not the red house). 
Additionally interacting more with peers than adults further results in those interactions 
being less pedagogical - peers will use words to refer to things rather than to consciously 
enhance other children's vocabulary. These differences in the amount (and manner) of 
dyadic caregiver-child interaction could lead to less exposure and familiarity with 
adjectives used in a descriptive function in non-western children, like the Chatinos of 
Teotepec. 
While we expect Chatino children to have the same understanding of contrastive 
use of adjectives as western children, we expect that their lack of exposure to 
descriptively used adjectives could lead to differences in understanding the descriptive 















SECTION 3: EXPERIMENTS 
The aim of the present work is to determine whether, how and why cultural 
differences impact verbal imitation across cultural groups. To investigate this four 
experiments have been carried out. 
Experiment 1 was in the first instance conducted on English-speaking children 
from the USA and Chatino-speaking Chatino children from Santa Lucia Teotepec, 
Oaxaca, Mexico. Because English, like German, is a language with pre-nominal 
adjectives, and Chatino has post-nominal adjectives, culture is not the only dimension on 
which the two groups differ. Potential differences in imitation behavior could thus be due 
to this grammatical difference and potential memory effects arising from it, that is, post-
nominal adjectives are easier to remember (Gupta, 2005). To be able to rule out this 
explanation, a group of French-speaking children from Geneva, Switzerland was 
additionally tested. French, like Chatino, is a language with post-nominal adjectives and 
Swiss culture, like American and German culture, is a western large-scale society. 
The insights gained from Experiment 1 allowed for formulating a more refined 
hypothesis to be tested in Experiments 2 and 3, which were conducted in Chatino culture. 









Chapter 5: Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 adopts the paradigm introduced by Bannard, Klinger and Tomasello 
(2013). It was designed to explore the effects of the informational demands of the 
communicative context of an utterance on the imitation of novel adjectives produced by 
an adult model. We were particularly interested in the presence of cross-cultural variation 
of over imitation and age effects. In the game that we devised to test this, it was the goal 
of the child and first experimenter (E1) to request a series of similar objects from a game 
master (E2).  E2 would hold up an object or pair of objects and E1 would request one and 
receive it. The child’s objective was then to obtain the same object as E1 via verbal 
request. In his requests, E1 would always add an adjective-like novel word to the real 
name of the object. In a two-object condition, two instances of an everyday object (one 
bearing slight modifications) were presented, and upon request E1 was handed the 
modified one, while in the one object condition only a single object was presented. We 
repeated both conditions 4 times and counterbalanced order. In the one-object condition, 
the adjective was redundant, while in the two-object condition it was necessary for the 
game master to determine which of the two objects the player referred to. We were 
interested in when the child would use the “adjective”, and when it would get filtered out, 
as well as in potential over imitation and in the developmental trajectory of all these 
behaviors. 
To check whether any potential differences are domain-specific, the experiment 
had an instrumental component (after Horner and Whiten, 2005) in which children would 
imitate actions performed on an either opaque or transparent, but otherwise identical, 
puzzle-box by an adult model. The model’s demonstration involved using a stick to 





the puzzle-box, and irrelevant actions whose execution did not contribute to that end 
goal. After the demonstration the experimenter handed the stick over to the child and 
announced that it was his or her turn. The experimenter then left the room and it was the 
child’s turn to play with the box. This procedure was repeated over three trials. Half of 
the participants were tested in the above-described conditions (one quarter with the 
opaque, the other quarter with the transparent apparatus), while the other half was tested 
in respective control conditions, where no demonstration was given and the experimenter 
simply handed the child the stick, saying “See what you can do with this.” We measured 




For the Chatino group, we tested twenty-nine typically developing, Chatino-
speaking children. Their ages ranged from 3 to 10 years. The children were native 
speakers of Chatino. Those who attended elementary school (ages six and older) also 
spoke Spanish. The children were tested in our field lab in Santa Lucía Teotepec, Oaxaca, 
Mexico. The experimenters conducting the study were local Chatino high school 
graduates who had previously received extensive training in conducting both linguistic 
and psychological research. Parental consent was obtained in all cases. 
For the Texas group, thirty-one typically developing, English-speaking children 
were included in the study. Their ages ranged from 3 to 10 years. The children were 
native speakers of American English and generally monolingual. One additional child 





Language Lab at the University of Texas at Austin. Parental consent was obtained in all 
cases. 
For the Swiss group 39 typically developing, French-speaking children were 
included in the study. Nineteen of the children were five years old; the other twenty were 
9 years old. The children were native speakers of Swiss-French and generally bilingual in 
a variety of other languages. Parental consent was obtained in all cases. 
 
Age Chatino Texas Geneva 
3 2 4  
4 4 4  
5 3 4 19 
6 6 4  
7 4 4  
8 3 4  
9 3 4 20 
10 3 3  
Table 1: Children that participated in Experiment 1 across cultures by age 
 
5.1.2 Materials and Design for the Verbal Part 
We used eight different items that we expected would be familiar to Chatino and 
Texan 3-year-olds and Swiss 5-year-olds, such as a plastic flower, a rubber duck and a 
spoon. Each item existed in a plain and a modified version. The modifications were 





adjective. For example, the modified version of the spoon had cloth-covered, worm-like 
wires pasted on. 
Our novel words were all one (Chatino) or two (English, French) syllables long, 
occurred at a position where adjectives would occur in Chatino, English or French, and 
followed the phonotactic norms for Chatino, English and French adjectives (e.g., 
kl7en(r), tun(r); wassy, snibby, sabé, fibé). Details of all adjectives and items can be 
found in the appendix. 
 
5.1.3 Procedure for the Verbal Part 
E1 and the child as the players and E2 as the game master sat on opposite sides of 
a mat. They played a game that required the child and E1 to request objects from E2. If 
they met the game’s objective to collect the same objects, they were allowed to put them 
into a cardboard box, decorated as a treasure chest. E1 would always go first and the 
child second, to ensure that the child would always have to selectively imitate E1’s 
request in order to obtain the same object. 
The experiment had two conditions. In the one object condition (functioning as a 
control) the game master held up a single plain object for a short period of time, declared 
that it was E1’s turn and then concealed the object. E1 then requested that object and in 
his request followed up the object’s label with a novel adjective (e.g., “ta chin7 skwe kto 
ka-X tun-B kwa 7yan” / “Give me the egg <adjective>”2 for the Chatino group, “Could 
you please give me the bribby cup” for the Texas group and “Tu pourrais me donner la 
                                                
2 Leipzig Glossing Rules: 
ta              chin7    skwe kto   ka-X tun-B kwa  7yan 
POT.give  a.little   egg   hen  (   ADJ      ) that   of.1sg 






fleur mitue?” for the Swiss group). E1 then received the requested item and the game 
master presented (and then concealed) a second instance of the object before announcing 
that it was the child’s turn. 
In the two-object condition the game master held up two instances of each object 
simultaneously, one plain and one bearing a modification, declared that it was E1’s turn 
and then concealed the objects. E1 uttered his request and followed up the object’s label 
with a novel adjective (e.g., “ta=chin7 skwe=kto ka tun kwa 7yan” / “Give me the egg 
<adjective>” for the Chatino group, “Could you please give me the bribby cup” for the 
Texas group and “Tu pourrais me donner la fleur mitue?” for the Swiss group) and 
thereupon received the modified object. The game master then presented a second set of 
both the plain and the modified object and announced that it was now the child's turn. 
Regardless of condition, and whether they imitated the adjective or not, the child always 
received the same object as E1. After they both had the same object, they were allowed to 
store them in the treasure chest. If the child hesitated to ask for an object, E1 encouraged 
him or her to speak (e.g., “What do you want?” or “Just ask.”). If the child still did not 
ask, E2 also said, “You can just ask me for it.” Each child went through eight trials, 
alternating between choice and control conditions. Items always occurred in the same 
order and were arranged in sets of two. The two conditions were fully counterbalanced 
across items within sets. This means that the participants were divided into the following 
groups: 
(1) One-object condition in trial 1, 3, 5 and 7; two-object condition in trial 
2, 4, 6 and 8 
(2) Two-object condition in trial 1, 3, 5 and 7; one-object condition in trial 





5.1.4 Warm-up Procedure for the Verbal Part 
In order to familiarize the child with the game, we went through a series of warm-
up trials. First we made sure that the child knew the basic labels of the objects used in the 
game. E1 showed the child the plain version of each item and asked whether he or her 
knew what it was called. If the child did not respond promptly or provided a false label, 
E1 corrected the child and asked him or her to repeat the correct label. 
Afterwards, E1 showed the child the treasure chest. He explained that they could 
store items that they had previously collected in the chest, but that in order to open the 
chest, they had to obtain matching items. To illustrate the rules of the game, E2 then 
proceeded to present a series of three familiar items (airplane, key, dice) that could be 
requested by E1 and the child. After the single objects, E2 presented four pairs of familiar 
objects that could be differentiated via an adjective (big/small ball, long/short thread, 
red/blue block, dark/light bird; in the Texas ans Swiss groups we used a dark/light frog 
instead of bird). E1 requested the small ball, the short thread, the blue block and the light 
bird. If the child picked a different object than that picked by the experimenter in any of 
the trials, E1 would praise the child for asking, but would at the same time lament that 
they did not have same items and therefore the rules did not allow them to place them in 
the treasure chest. Finally, E1 would suggest that, even though it was against the rules, 
they could still put them in the treasure chest, but had to be careful to pick matching 
items in future trials. 
If the child asked for the matching item right away, E1 contently explained that 
this was a very fortunate choice, since it would enable them to store their matching items 
in the treasure chest. He also explained that they would not have been able to so, if the 





The warm up concluded with two trials of single modified items (an egg with 
pieces of grey cloth glued to it and a toy horse with pieces of green plastic leaves). In his 
request, E1 produced a novel adjective in addition to the basic label of the respective 
item. Upon receiving the item, he would talk about how well the object displays the 
fictional quality described by the novel adjective, producing the novel adjective an 
additional two times. The goal of this part of the warm up was to make it easier for the 
children to understand that the novel adjective could be use to describe features of the 
modified objects. 
 
5.1.5 Transcription and Coding for the Verbal Part 
We coded for four different types of response: production of a bare noun (“Could 
you give me the duck”), reproduction of the novel adjective and noun (“Could you give 
me the wassy duck”), production of a familiar adjective and noun (“Could you give me 
the shiny duck”) and production of a paraphrases (“Could you give me the duck with the 
shiny things on it”). While some of the western children used familiar adjectives and 
some of the older (seven years and above) western children used paraphrases, the only 
types of responses that we observed in Chatino children were bare noun and reproduction 
of the novel adjective and noun. Responses were coded as “replication” in cases where 
the child produced the novel adjective or a phonologically similar form (e.g., “7en” for 
“ty7en”; “bibby” for “bribby”). Responses in which the child did not reproduce the 
adjective (i.e., no phonological information was added to the determiner and object-
name) were coded as “bare noun”.  
When the child failed to produce a request in the first experimental trial, we 





coded as a missing data point. If the child did not produce a request in other trials than 
the first, no repetition of the trial took place and response was coded as a missing data 
point.  
For the Chatino data these criteria gave a total of 3 missing data points out of a 
total of 224 trials. The data were coded by a Chatino research assistant at the field site. A 
second Chatino research assistant further coded data for a randomly chosen 32% of trials. 
Agreement between coders was 100%. 
For the Texas data these criteria gave us 2 missing data points out of a total of 248 
trials. The data were coded by a research assistant and another research assistant coded a 
randomly chosen 25% of the trials for reliability. Agreement between coders was 98.4%, 
κ =.96. For the Swiss data these criteria gave us 8 missing data points out of 312 trials. 
Agreement between the first coder and a reliability coder who coded a randomly chosen 
25% of the trials was 99%, κ =.983. 
 
5.1.6 Materials and Design for the Instrumental Part 
Following Horner and Whiten (2005), we used two structurally identical 8 cubic 
inch plastic boxes, one transparent and the other opaque. The topside of each box had a 
round one-inch hole, protected by a bolt, with a metal hook on one end, which could be 
removed to expose the hole.  The front of the box had a round two-inch hole that lead to a 
downward sloping opaque tube inside the box. This hole was covered by a door, which 
was, in turn, protected by two small bolts (see below for more detail). A Ping-Pong ball 
covered with Velcro was placed at the bottom of the opaque tube, and could be retrieved 





inch wooden stick with Velcro attached to its top into the front hole and pulling out the 
reward.  
 
5.1.7 Procedure for the Instrumental Part 
After a period of casual play (e.g., coloring books), E1 told the child participants 
that he wanted to play a game. E1 seated the child directly in front of the apparatus and 
told him or her to pay close attention, since it would be his or her turn soon. E1 then used 
the stick to perform a series of actions on the box:  
(1) He tapped the left side of the top bolt, then the right side and then the left side 
again, before inserting the stick into the hook on the right end of the bolt to remove it and 
uncover the top hole. The Velcro end of the stick was used for this. 
(2) He inserted the stick into the uncovered hole and pulled it out again. The non-
Velcro end of the stick was used for this. 
(3) He used the stick to tap the left side of the upper bolt that protects the door on 
the front face of the box, then tapped its right side and then the left side again, before 
pushing the bolt out with the stick. The Velcro end of the stick was used for this. 
(4) He did the same as above with the lower bolt. 
(5) He removed the door using his hand. 
(6) He inserted the stick into the hole to retrieve the ball, nodded and contently 
said ‘Oh!’ The Velcro end of the stick was used for this. 
As previously mentioned, the only actions relevant to retrieving the ball were 
removing the bolts that protected the door on the front face of the box and opening the 
door. Neither the actions performed on the topside of the box, nor insertion of the stick 





on the top bolt or the small bolts protecting the door had no benefit over removing these 
parts by hand. With regards to retrieving the ball, it did not matter whether the bolts were 
pushed out by use of the stick or pulled out by hand.  
At the beginning of the experiment, after E1’s first demonstration, he would tell 
the child that he would do it again and that it would be the child’s turn soon. Then, after 
E2 had reset the apparatus out of the child’s sight, E1 repeated the above-described 
demonstration. He then repeated it one more time, before informing the child that it was 
his or her turn. To reduce effects of social conforming that might result in blind imitation, 
E1 left the testing room during the child’s turn. After the child retrieved the ball (in all 
conditions with a demonstration) or after one minute (in the no demonstration cases), E1 
returned, E2 reset the box and it was E1’s turn again. 
Following Whiten (1998) and Horner and Whiten (2005), each child saw the 
experimenter’s demonstration three times in a row before it was his or her first trial. He 
or she then saw two additional demonstrations and two trials, such that the order of trials 
was:  Demo > Demo > Demo > Trial 1 > Demo > Trial 2 > Demo > Trial 3. 
The apparatus was presented in two conditions, opaque and transparent. In the 
opaque condition, no information about the causal relevance of the model’s actions could 
be inferred: Participants could neither see the location of the ball, nor the effect of the 
stick inside the apparatus. Half of the Chatino participants were tested in the two 
conditions, while the other half of were tested in respective control conditions, where no 
demonstration was performed and the experimenter simply handed the child the stick, 
saying, “See what you can do with this.” That means that Chatino participants were 
divided into the following four equally sized groups: 





(2) Transparent box, demonstration 
(3) Opaque box, no demonstration 
(4) Transparent box, no demonstration. 
All Texas and Geneva participants were tested with a demonstration. The reason 
for this was that neither participants tested in previous work (e.g., Horner and Whiten, 
2005) nor our Chatino participants produced any of the actions when not receiving a 
demonstration. It was therefor already well established that children do not produce the 
actions when they do not receive a demonstration and thus testing children in a no 
demonstration condition would not have given us additional insights. That means that the 
Texas and Geneva participants were divided into the following two almost equally sized 
groups: 
(1) Opaque box, demonstration 
(2) Transparent box, demonstration 
We observed what actions the children performed on the apparatus when it was 
their turn. 
 
5.1.8 Transcription and Coding for the Instrumental Part 
In our coding we noted which of the actions demonstrated by E1 the child 
imitated in each trial. One point was awarded for each of the above-mentioned steps. 
For the Chatino data, the responses were coded by a local research assistant. They 
were additionally coded by a research assistant who was blind to the goals of the study. A 
second research assistant then reliability-coded 25% of the data. Agreement between the 





For the Texas data, the responses were coded by an RA who was ignorant of the 
purpose of the study. Additionally I reliability-coded 25% of the responses. Agreement 
between the two coders was perfect at 100%. 
 
5.1.9 Analysis for the Verbal Component 
Following Bannard, Klinger and Tomasello (2013), we analyzed our data using 
logistic choice models, as is standard for studies in which the response is a choice 
between independent discrete options (Train, 2009). Because each child went through 
multiple trials, we used multilevel versions of the models in which participant was 
included as a random effect to the intercept(s). We used the Bayesian Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods of the JAGS software. Diffuse (non informative) priors 
were used for all parameters. We performed model comparisons using the Deviance 
Information Criterion (Spiegelhalter, Best, Carlin and van der Linde, 2002). Model 
selection was performed by comparing all possible combinations of predictors and 
interactions between predictors including a null model. We report the mean value as well 
as the lower and upper bounds of the 95% plausible intervals for each fixed parameter. In 
multinomial logistic regression, one response type is assigned to be the reference 
outcome and one then estimates how the different predictors affect the odds of seeing the 
other responses types relative to the reference class. Its interpretation is similar to that of 
multiple binomial logistic models. We made the bare noun response our reference class. 
The tables of model parameters thus contain an intercept for each of the other responses 
(imitation, familiar adjective and paraphrase) and estimates of how being in the choice 





response. Age was grand mean centered for the Texas and Chatino samples (where we 
had a wide spread of ages) and factorialized for the Swiss sample. 
 
5.2 RESULTS 
5.2.1 Results for the Verbal Component 
We summarize the results of the verbal component of Experiment 1 in Figure 1. 
The stacked area and stacked bar charts show the proportions of all four responses across 
trials in each condition. Comparing the single-object to the two-object condition across 
the three cultures, we see a clear pattern. The English-speaking and the French-speaking 
children produce a greater amount of bare noun responses in the one-object control, when 
the adjective serves no contrastive function, than they do in the two-object condition in 
which the adjective is required to identify the referent. Chatino children, however, show 























a) English speaking children in Austin, Texas 
 
b) French speaking children in Geneva, Switzerland 
              
c) Chatino speaking children in Santa Lucía Teotepec, Oaxaca, Mexico
  
Figure 1: Percentage of Response Categories over Age in the Single Object and the 
Choice Condition for Children from a) Austin, Texas, USA, b) Geneva, 
Switzerland, c) Santa Lucia Teotepec, Oaxaca, Mexico3 
                                                
3 Note that there appears to be a dip in the graph depicting the responses for Texas children at 8 years of 
age, as well is in the graph for Chatino children at 7 years of age. The most likely reason for this is 





5.2.1.1 English-Speaking Children in Texas 
In this group of children we found all four possible response types. We thus used 
a multinomial logistic regression model for the analysis. A model with condition and age 
as predictors, but without their interaction, offered the best fit to the data. The fixed 
effects can be seen in table 1. All three of the non-bare-noun responses (imitation, 
familiar adjective and paraphrase) were significantly more likely to occur in the two-
object condition than in the one-object condition. Imitation rate was not significantly 
affected by age, but the rate of paraphrase responses increased significantly (and the rate 




















Table 2: Summary of fixed effects for multi-level multinomial logistic regression 
analysis for verbal component of Experiment 1 for Texas participants 
(single-object condition coded as 0, choice condition coded as 1) 
  Mean 
Estimate 




Intercept  2.595       1.968 4.649 0.930   <0.001 
Condition 2.075    0.892 3.414 0.641  <0.001 




Intercept  -2.742   -5.398 -0.560 1.259 <0.005 
Condition 2.301   0.666 4.067 0.864 <0.003 
Age 0.659   -0.317 1.769 0.528  0.087 
Paraphrase Intercept  -98.122 -227.149 -10.055 77.54 <0.001 
Condition 97.3737 9.361 226.714 77.51 <0.001 





5.2.1.2 French-Speaking Children in Geneva 
A multinomial logistic regression model with condition and age and their 
interactions offered the best fit for the data. Table 2 shows the fixed effects. Imitation and 
paraphrase responses were significantly more likely in the two-object condition than in 
the one-object condition. Imitation rate decreased significantly with age in the one-object 
condition, but remained constant in the two-object condition. Neither the rate of familiar 
adjectives or paraphrases was significantly affected by age. 
 
Table 3: Summary of  fixed effects for multi-level multinomial logistic regression 
analysis for verbal component of Experiment 1 for Swiss participants 
(single-object condition coded as 0, choice condition coded as 1) 
  Mean 
Estimate 
   95%  Intervals     SD pMCMC 
Lower Upper 
Imitation Intercept  0.968    -2.087 4.380 1.638    0.257 
Condition 1.076   -0.039 2.268 0.588    0.032 
Age -37.739   -83.798 -9.815 21.16 <0.001 




Intercept     -6.817 -13.958 -1.363 3.196 <0.01 
Condition 0.694 -2.291 3.618 1.496 0.319 
Age  14.691 -64.030 74.024 39.766 0.248 
 Condition*Age -9.621 -67.909 68.556 39.586 0.302 
Paraphrase Intercept    -55.810 -112.306 -15.157 26.100 <0.001 
Condition 26.642 6.388 54.929 13.047 <0.001 
Age -43.876 -167.307 35.706 55.048 0.327 





5.2.1.3 Chatino-Speaking Children in Santa Lucía Teotepec 
Unlike the American and the Swiss children, the Chatinos produced only two 
different responses – bare noun and imitation. No combinations of predictors was found 
to improve the fit over a null model, indicating that the responses were unaffected by 
both age and condition. 
5.2.2 Results for the Instrumental Component 
First we compared children’s imitation in the demonstration and the no 
demonstration condition. Their mean rate of production of the coded actions on the box 
in the demonstration were 74.2%, and significantly less at 2.4 % in the no-demonstration 
condition as confirmed by a t-test (t(16) = -17.756, p < 0.0001). There was no difference 
in imitation between transparent and opaque boxes. To analyze how culture or age might 
affect the rate of imitation we built several linear regression models predicting imitation 
rate from all combinations of culture and age, including the null model. A model 
predicting imitation rate from age alone offered the best fit for the data. Imitation rate 
increased with age (B = 0.041, p < 0.0001). Culture had no effect on imitation rate. 
 
5.3 DISCUSSION 
The combined results of Experiment 1 present a striking picture. The children in 
Texas and Switzerland showed the same pattern as the German children tested in 
Bannard, Klinger and Tomasello (2013). They imitated the experimenter’s novel 
adjective at a significantly higher rate when it had a clear communicative function (in the 
two-object condition) and were more likely to drop it otherwise as indicated by a lower 
rate of bare-noun responses and an increase in the three different imitation responses in 





discrimination, showing a stable rate of bare noun and imitation responses across 
conditions. In the Texan and Swiss children the selectivity of imitation increased with 
age, albeit we also see a new phenomenon in the older children, the use of alternative 
phrasing in making their requests. In the Chatino group no changes in imitation rate or 
selectivity with age were found. 
A simple explanation for these findings would be that the Chatino children 
generally show a different imitation behavior. This is, however, not the case, as we also 
tested all children in an instrumental imitation task, in which we observed no differences 
between the groups. Hence it is likely that the difference is specific to language. There 
are multiple possibilities for how language could affect imitation: Chatino children could 
generally display a different pattern of imitation in verbal tasks (e.g., more bare-noun 
responses), potentially because their language learning is observational rather than 
interactional. Secondly their abilities to read speaker intentions or infer the function of 
words might differ from that of the western children. Third and finally, it might be that 
the differences in imitation are due to cross-cultural differences in time spent in dyadic 
caregiver-child interaction that leave western and Chatino children with different degrees 
of knowledge about descriptive and contrastive adjectives. As previously suggested, the 
amount of dyadic mother-child interaction in a culture could impact the children’s 
understanding of adjectives in reference. Learning language by imitation for a child 
means observing adults’ utterances and then creatively recombining their elements 
afterwards. To do that efficiently, the child must figure out what part of the utterance 
refers to what entity in the world (Tomasello, 2003), which means constantly establishing 
reference. Children from western cultures, who are first exposed to the descriptive use of 





helps in singling out a referent, that is, contrastive, or whether it is descriptive, that is, 
describes a property of an already known referent. Children from non-western cultures on 
the other hand might find this more challenging. Having been exposed mainly to the 
contrastive use of adjectives, they might have a propensity towards assuming that the 
adjectives serve a purpose in reference even if this is not the case. 
This relates to our experiment as follows: When the experimenter uses an 
adjective in his or her request in the one-object condition, this adjective is redundant with 
regards to formulating a successful request. English- and French-speaking children, who 
through their mother-child play are used to encountering adjectives in non-contrastive 
contexts, are familiar with this scenario. They thus recognize the adjective as having no 
function (it does not describe a property of the object) and may omit it. The Chatino 
children on the other hand might not be very familiar with the descriptive use of 
adjectives and thus could expect the adjective to be contrastive and serve a purpose in the 
context. Since in the one-object condition they cannot infer that purpose, their safest 
strategy is faithful imitation. This account is in line with findings of over imitation in the 
instrumental domain where it has been suggested that children will assume that tasks 
have a hidden causal (Lyons, Young and Keil, 2007) or conventional (Kenward, Karlsson 
and Persson, 2011) structure when none is immediately apparent to them. 
In order to further test this explanation, two additional experiments were 
conducted to test the explanation and rule out alternatives. Experiment 2 set out to 
confirm that Chatino children do not just generally display different imitation patterns in 
linguistic tasks. In Experiment 3 we checked that differences in imitation were not due to 






Chapter 6: Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1 we found that children from the USA and Switzerland selectively 
imitate a novel adjective at a higher rate when it serves a purpose in the functional 
context of the utterance compared to when it is redundant, as indicated by a lower rate of 
bare-noun responses and an increase in the three other responses in the 2-object 
condition. Chatino children did not show such selectivity. Our hypothesis is that this is 
due to cross-cultural differences in the use of adjectives and referring expressions. A 
simple alternative explanation would be that Chatino children in general behave 
differently when imitating verbal material. To rule out this possibility Experiment 2 was 
conducted. In Experiment 2, we paired a same-category condition, in which, just like in 
Experiment 1, two objects from the same category, one with modifications, one without, 
were presented with a different-category control condition, in which one modified item 
was presented alongside an unmodified distractor from a different basic level category. 
When the objects that are presented are from the same category, the adjective is essential 
in unambiguously determining reference. When a modified target was presented 
alongside an unmodified distractor from a different category only the bare noun was 
needed for unambiguously identifying the target. For the German children tested in 
Bannard, Klinger and Tomasello (2013) imitation rates of the novel adjective were lower 
in the different objects condition. Because the target object was identical (modified) in 
both cases, this difference cannot be attributed to any differences in motivation to 
describe. Instead their interpretation was that the child understood the situation and knew 
how to achieve unambiguous reference without using the adjective.  
If, as we propose might be the case, the difference between the Chatino and the 





children but not the Chatino children) is due to differing propensities to interpret 
adjectives as purely descriptive in purpose, then the Chatino children should show a 




We tested 22 typically developing, Chatino-speaking children. Their ages ranged 
from 3 to 10 years. The children were native speakers of Chatino and those of them who 
attended elementary school (ages six and older) also spoke Spanish. The children were 
tested in our field lab in Santa Lucía Teotepec, Oaxaca, Mexico. The experimenters 
conducting the study were local Chatino high school graduates who had previously 
received extensive training in conducting both linguistic and psychological research. 
Parental consent was obtained in all cases. 
Age 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Children 3 6 3 0 2 3 2 4 
Table 4: Children that participated in Experiment 2 across cultures by age 
 
6.1.2 Materials and Design 
We used the same objects and adjectives as in Experiment 1. We introduced four 
new familiar objects that served as distractors in the four control trials. Details are given 






We used the same procedure as in Experiment 1. The only difference was that in 
the control condition E2 presented a modified object and a plain object of a different 
category. 
6.1.4 Coding 
We used the same coding scheme as in Experiment 1. We obtained a total of 176 data 
points. The data were coded by a Chatino research assistant on the field site. A second 
Chatino research assistant further coded data for a randomly chosen 32% while only 
having access to the audio tracks of the recordings and thus being blind to condition. 
Agreement between coders was 100%. 
6.1.5 RESULTS 
We summarize the children’s responses in figure 2, which again shows the 
proportion of each type of response for both conditions. 
 
Figure 2: The proportions for each different response for each condition by age in 
Experiment 24 
                                                
4 The graph depicting the responses from experiment 2 shows dips and peaks at 5, 7 and 8 years of age. 





As in our previous analysis we built a logistic choice model to analyze the data. 
Because all except for 2 responses in a single condition were either bare noun or 
imitation, rather than having to impute so many missing values for the paraphrase 
response, we simply discarded the three data points and performed a binomial logistic 
regression. A model with condition and age as predictors, but not their interaction was 
found to offer the best fit to the data. Imitation rate was significantly greater in the same 
category condition than in the different category condition and also marginally 













Table 5: Summary of fixed effects for multi-level binomial logistic regression analysis 
for verbal component of Experiment 2 (different-category condition coded 
as 0, same-category condition coded as 1) 
6.1.6 DISCUSSION 
In line with our predictions and unlike in Experiment 1 the Chatino children 
produce a clear difference between conditions in Experiment 2 and thus in this 
experiment exhibit a pattern that is similar to that of the German children tested in 
Bannard, Klinger and Tomasello (2013). This supports our suggestion that western 
  Mean 
Estimate 
   95%  Intervals     SD pMCMC 
Lower Upper 
Imitation Intercept  -2.175   -5.012 0.422 1.380 <0.05 
Condition 1.600  0.585 2.686 0.531 <0.001 





children’s greater familiarity with the descriptive use of adjectives lead to the differences 
in results in Experiment 1. Their experience with a specific use of adjectives provides 
them with a better understanding of the experimenter’s intentions and thus results in them 
using a different imitation strategy: When children have a good understanding of the 
adult model’s motivation to produce the adjective, they can be selective in their imitation, 
when the adult’s motivations are opaque, they resort to faithful imitation. Another 
potential explanation for the results so far is that Chatino children differ from western 
children in their theory-of-mind skills. The possibility that this could have caused the 

















Chapter 7: Experiment 3 
Similar to Experiment 3 in Bannard, Klinger and Tomasello (2013), this third 
experiment investigates whether Chatino children read an adult’s intentions and use this 
information in deciding when to imitate in the same way that western children do. The 
situation we chose to test this is one in which they encounter accidental speech: slips-of-
the-tongue. Our control condition was similar to the one-object control condition in 
Experiment 1. We paired it with an accident condition in which E2 presented a single 
plain object and E1 used an adjective in his request. Immediately after uttering the 
adjective E1 would indicate via gesture that he had misspoken and the adjective was 
unintentional.  
In order to determine whether any effects found were particular to language, we 
also ran an analogous instrumental imitation study based on Carpenter, Akhtar and 
Tomasello (1998). E1 demonstrated two actions on an object that activated an outcome 
(sound being played). E1 verbally and gesturally marked one of them as accidental and 
the other one as intentional. Then it was the child’s turn and we observed whether they 




We tested 17 typically developing, Chatino-speaking children. Their ages ranged 
from 4 to 10 years. The children were native speakers of Chatino and those who attended 
elementary school (ages six and older) also spoke Spanish. The children were tested in 





the study were local Chatino high school graduates who had previously received 
extensive training in conducting both linguistic and psychological research. Parental 
consent was obtained in all cases. We used a within-subjects design. Each child 
participated in both the verbal and the instrumental part of the experiment. 
 
Age 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Children 0 2 3 2 1 4 3 2 
Table 6: Children that participated in Experiment 3 across cultures by age 
 
7.1.2 Materials and Design for the Verbal Component 
We used the unmodified objects and the adjectives from Experiment 1. 
 
7.1.3 Procedure for the Verbal Component 
The requesting game was similar to the one used in Experiments 1 and 2, with a 
few critical differences. In both the control and the accident condition a single plain item 
was used. In the accident condition, right after E1 uttered the adjective, he performed a 
gesture to mark it as unintentional. The gesture consisted of a face-palm and head-
shaking, while looking at the child. 
We also made some changes and additions to the warm-up. To introduce the slip-
of-the-tongue gesture, when we checked if they knew the names of the test objects, we 
presented three additional items and E1 made use of the gesture after labeling these 
incorrectly. Afterwards he stated that he had misspoken and produced the correct label. 





one item, but then used the gesture to indicate that he had misspoken, corrected himself 
and then requested the other item (“Give me the red . . . *gesture* blue brick”). The final 
two warm-up trials with single modified objects were left out. 
 
7.1.4 Coding for the Verbal Component 
We used the same coding scheme as in Experiment 1. We obtained a total of 136 
data points. The data were coded by a Chatino research assistant on the field site. A 
second Chatino research assistant further coded data for a randomly chosen 25% while 
only having access to the audio tracks of the recordings and thus being blind to condition. 
Agreement between coders was 100%. 
 
7.1.5 Materials and Design for the Instrumental Action Component 
We created six different objects. Each object had two modifications that each 
afforded one action (e.g., pull a stick out of a hole, turn a wheel). All objects had an end 
result – a chime sound - that could be activated by E2.  Additionally we created two 
warm-up objects, one of them with one modification, the other one with two. 
 
7.1.6 Materials and Design for the Instrumental Action Component 
E2 put a randomly chosen object between himself on one side and E1 and the 
child on the other. E1 then stated that it was his turn to demonstrate how the object 
worked and performed the first action on the object and then verbally and gesturally 
marked it as either intentional or accidental. E2 activated the end result two seconds after 





end result. Then it was the child’s turn and we observed their imitation of the actions 
previously demonstrated by E1. This was repeated once, resulting in us obtaining two 
data points per objects. The whole sequence was then repeated for the other five objects. 
The actions performed on an object occurred in one of the following sequences: 1. 
Intentional – Accidental, 2. Accidental – Intentional, 3. Intentional – Intentional. With six 
objects this resulted in each order occurring twice per participant. When the intentional – 
intentional order was used, E2 activated the end result two seconds after the second 
intentional action had been performed. 
 
7.1.7 Warm-up Procedure for the Instrumental Component 
E2 put the first warm-up object in-between himself and E1 and the child. E1 then 
stated that he would show how the object worked. He then performed the single action on 
the object in a very deliberate way, but without verbally or gesturally marking it as 
intentional. After E1 performed the action E2 activated the end result and E1 and the 
child shared happiness and excitement over it. Then the object was reset and it was the 
child’s turn to perform the action. If he or she did not perform the action, it was 
demonstrated again. Hence we taught the child how to interact with the objects, but not to 
imitate intentional actions. Then the second warm-up object was presented. E1 performed 
two actions on this object before E2 activated the end result. Then the object was reset 
and it was the child’s turn. If he or she did not perform the actions or performed only one 
action, E1 provided feedback until he or she performed both actions. During the warm-
up, the first and second warm-up object afforded one or two actions respectively to not 






7.1.8 Coding for the Instrumental Component 
For each trial we coded whether the child imitated action one and two. Out of 432 
trials, we obtained a total of 428 data points. The data were coded by a research assistant 
at the University of Texas at Austin. Another research assistant further coded data for a 
randomly chosen 25% of trials. Agreement between coders was 100%. 
 
7.2 RESULTS 
7.2.1 Results for the Verbal Component 
The children’s responses are summarized in figure 3, which shows the proportion 
of responses of each type for each condition. 
 
 
Figure 3: The proportions for each different response for each condition by age in 
Experiment 3 
In order to analyze this data we again built logistic choice models. Because all 





imitation, rather than having to impute so many missing values for the paraphrase 
response, we again simply discarded the four data points and performed a binomial 
logistic regression. A model with condition and age as predictors but no interaction was 
found to give the best fit to the data. The rate of imitation was found to be significantly 
lower in the accidental condition than in the intentional condition. It was not significantly 








Table 7: Summary of fixed effects for multi-level binomial logistic regression analysis 
for verbal component of Experiment 3 (intentional condition coded as 0, 
accidental condition coded as 1) 
 
7.2.2 Results for the Instrumental Component 
We used a multilevel binomial logistic choice model with child and trial block (as 
there were multiple responses on each trial) as random effects on the intercept. Model 
selection was performed by comparing all possible combinations of predictors and 
interactions. A model with condition, age and an interaction between the two offered the 
best fit for the data. The rate of imitation was significantly lower in the accident condition 
  Mean 
Estimate 
   95%  Intervals     SD pMCMC 
Lower Upper 
Imitation Intercept  2.159   0.148 4.225    1.040 <0.02 
Condition -2.557  -3.823 -1.462 0.601 <0.001 





than in the intentional condition. (log odds = -3.6733; z = -6.266; p < 0.0001). Imitation 
rate increased significantly with mean-centered age (log odds = 1.0840; z = 3.026 ; p = 
0.003), but this increase was significantly lower in the accidental condition than in the 
intentional condition (log odds = -0.5899; z = -2.424; p = 0.016). 
 
7.3 DISCUSSION 
The patterns of results observed for the verbal component of Experiment 3 are the 
same as those for German-speaking children. The results of the instrumental component 
were the same as reported in Carpenter, Akhtar and Tomasello (1998). Our results thus 
suggest that, just like their western counterparts, Chatino children prefer to imitate words 
and actions that are intentional compared to those that are accidental. We can thus rule 
out differences in intention reading abilities as an explanation for the findings in 
Experiment 1. Our alternative hypothesis, based on the results from the first three 
experiments, is thus that imitation is strongly determined by “opacity”. If a situation is 
opaque and the learner is unaware of the function of each action and word they observe a 
model perform or utter, the safest strategy is to imitate (see Background section 1.5 on 
Why Do Humans Over Imitate). Only if the purpose of actions and words is clear, are we 
able to decide which actions or words are not relevant to the end result of a task and omit 
them selectively. Whether this claim can be supported in general, that is, independent of 










Chapter 8: Experiment 4 
As  over imitation can serve to transmit, maintain and evolve cultural conventions 
(Nielsen, 2012). Further, over imitation can be used to express affiliation to (e.g., Nielsen 
and Blank, 2011) and to acquire causal information about the objects and actions 
involved (e.g., Lyons, Young and Keil, 2007). While the causal knowledge theory and 
social affiliation theory are supported by experimental evidence, they do not fully explain 
some very basic findings. Going back to one of the first studies documenting over 
imitation and the research that follows up on it exemplifies this. 
Horner and Whiten (2005) found over imitation in 3 and 4 year old children and  
follow-up studies showed that the older participants get, the more they over imitate 
(McGuigan, Whiten, Flynn and Horner, 2007), with adults reaching the level of “super 
copiers” (McGuigan, Makinson and Whiten, 2011). The literature explains this mostly by 
arguing that humans get a better social and casual understanding as they develop. Their 
increased social awareness leads to higher imitation rates to express affiliation and their 
better causal understanding leads allows them interpret seemingly irrelevant actions as 
intentional. Thus their imitation rate increases. 
This seems sensible when looking at children, but the notion that adults will copy 
almost 100% of clearly unnecessary actions to socially affiliate with an experimenter that 
they have no relationship with and will likely not see again after the experiment seems 
unintuitive at best. Similarly the notion that an adult with elaborate knowledge of the 
world would imitate the above-mentioned actions on a puzzle box in order to enhance his 





The points made above gain additional relevance when looking at the instructions 
that the participants received in the experiments in question. Before the model 
demonstrated the sequence of actions, the participants were told “watch me closely, 
because it is going to be your turn soon”. We propose that these instructions suggest that 
the goal of the task is to imitate the experimenter faithfully and that this is an important 
reason for why over imitation was found in those studies. In fact, in the debriefing of the 
McGuigan, Makinson and Whiten (2011) study, participants stated that they were under 
the impression that faithful imitation of the model was the goal of the game.  
This proposal is supported by the findings of recent work investigating whether 
the way in which a task is framed (verbally) has an impact on human (over) imitation. 
Legare, Wen, Herrmann and Whitehouse (2015) classify the frame of a task as either 
instrumental or ritualistic. In an instrumental frame the “physical-causal basis of an 
action is in principle knowable, even if it is currently unknown”, that is the learner can in 
theory figure out what physical effect each action has and how it contributes to the 
physical goal of the task. In a ritualistic frame, in contrast, “the rational for interpreting a 
sequence of actions is not in principle knowable from the perspective of physical 
causality and instead is based on social conventionality”. This means that figuring out the 
meaning of individual actions will be much harder for the learner as their meaning is 
opaque. It might even be impossible, if the action demonstrated is purely a cultural 
convention and the (social) goal is indeed to replicate the whole sequence of actions 
faithfully. Experimental studies confirmed that verbal instructions can indeed lead to such 
a conventionalist interpretation of the task. When the instructions framed the task as 
something conventional, e.g., by the model saying “this is how she always does it”, 





Legare, Wen, Herrmann and Whitehouse, 2015; Clegg and Legare, in press). Further 
even more subtle cues can lead to such a conventional interpretation. When the start and 
end points of a movement are the same, humans appear to interpret the movement/actions 
themselves as the goal of the task and imitate the movements and actions at a higher rate 
than when start and end point are different (Schachner and Carey, 2013; Legare, Wen, 
Herrmann and Whitehouse, 2015)5.  
We propose that when instructions are given that frame a task such that the 
elements that constitute the task become opaque, that is the meaning of each individual 
element with respect to the outcome is hard or impossible to determine, humans imitate 
faithful. When, in contrast, the instructions help understanding how each element relates 
to the outcome, that is the function of the elements is clear, imitation will be selective and 
imitation rate will be lower. We investigated this in Experiment 4, manipulating opacity, 
the presence of a clearly defined goal and the amount of effort that imitating unnecessary 
actions would take. In this experiment, an experimenter played a simple board game with 
the participant. From a start point two paths led to a goal. As is common for board games, 
the paths were divided into little squares. For one third of trials both paths had the same 
length (and number of squares), for the second third one path was two thirds the length of 
                                                
5 This account that over imitation could be a response to seeing normative conventions as summed 
up by Kenward (2012) finds support in more recent studies. When a sequence of actions is framed as 
conventional (e.g., by highlighting the method of performing unnecessary actions), children complain about 
a puppet not over imitating unnecessary actions more than when an instrumental frame is applied, e.g., by 
highlighting the goal of an action (Keupp, Behne and Rakoczy, 2013; Keupp, Behne, Zachow, Kasbohm, 






the other and for the last third one path was one third the length of the other. The 
experimenter always went first (and on the unequal paths trials took the longer path to the 
goal). Afterwards it was the participant’s turn. We tested three groups of participants. The 
first group was tested in the transparent condition, in which the goal of the game was 
clearly defined (i.e., the experimenter stated that the goal is to get the Lego men to the 
destination). The other two groups were tested in two different opaque conditions. In the 
opaque-baseline condition, no goal was defined. Finally, in the opaque-attend to means 
condition, the participants were again not told a goal but received instructions (similar to 
those used in previous work on over imitation) that directed them to pay attention to the 
means used by the experimenter. This opaque-attend to means condition might thus be 
the closest to the situation that Chatino children faced in Experiment 1: the situation is 
opaque to them, and even though no explicit goal is stated, there may be a hidden social 
goal (here: attend to the means,  in experiment 1: keep the conversation going).  
In line with our previously explained findings and hypothesis, we predict that 
participants will imitate the model and take the long path in the opaque conditions, 
because of the possibility that taking the short path leads to not achieving the hidden 
social goal. We predict that this inference that there is a hidden social goal will be more 
available to participants when they are told to pay attention to the means used. Thus we 
expect to see the highest rate of imitation in the opaque-attend to means condition. For 
the opaque-baseline condition imitation behavior would be contingent on whether 
participants are naturally predisposed to assume that there is a hidden social goal, even 
when no clues alluding to this are given. Younger learners (children), would be more 
likely to have such a predisposition than experienced learners (adults). We thus predict 





the goal and rules are known and it is thus clear that there is no benefit from taking the 
long path and that no penalty is connected with taking the short path, we predict that  




For the adult group we tested 48 English-speaking undergraduates from the 
University of Texas at Austin. Participants were recruited through the Linguistics 
Department Subject Pool and consent was obtained in all cases. For the child group we 
tested 45 English-speaking children (ages six to ten) from Austin, Texas, USA. For each 
age we tested nine children. One child had to be dropped due to fussiness, meaning that 
44 children are included in our analyses. Table 8 illustrates the children included in the 
respective age groups and conditions. 
 
Age Transparent Opaque-baseline Opaque-atm 
6 2 3 3 
7 3 4 2 
8 4 2 3 
9 3 2 4 
10 3 3 3 






8.1.2 Materials and Design 
We used eighteen different boards and fully counterbalanced the ratio of the 
length of the two paths (1:1, 2:3, 1:3), the side on which the longer path was (left, right) 
and theme (Forest, Desert, Space). Each ratio occurred six times per participant. The 
order of the boards was randomized. The different themes were implemented to make the 
boards look more interesting for children, but had no impact on the mechanics of the 
game. Additionally we used Lego structures as the goals for each map (castle, ruins, 
space ship) and two Lego men as tokens for the players. 
8.1.3 Procedure 
The procedure was the same for adult and child participants. The experimenter sat 
in front of the first board and the participants on the right side. The instructions given in 
each condition can be seen in the table below: 
Transparent condition 
Instructions: “We’re gonna play this level now. It is our goal to get our men to the 
castle/ruins/space ship and there are only two rules. Rule number one 
is that you have to stay on the path and rule number two is that you 
can only take one square at a time.” 
Effect: Excludes an interpretation of the rules that there is a hidden goal to the 
game. 
Opaque-baseline condition 
Instructions: “We’re gonna play this level now. Let’s try to stay on the path and only 
take one square at a time. It’s my turn.”  
Effect: Neither guides towards nor excludes an interpretation of the rules that 





Opaque-attend to means 
Instructions: “We’re gonna play this level now. Let’s try to stay on the path and only 
take one square at a time. Watch me closely, because it’s gonna be 
your turn soon. It’s my turn.” 
Effect: Guides the participant towards the possibility that the game might have 
a hidden goal. 
Table 9: Summary of the conditions of Experiment 4 
After stating the instructions, the experimenter then put his or her Lego man on 
the starting square and used the long path to get to the goal (in those cases in which both 
paths were the same length, the path they took was predetermined and counterbalanced). 
Then they switched seats and it was the participant’s turn. We observed whether the 
participant took the long path or the short path. Afterwards the experimenter said that 
they would now play the next level and the above was repeated for all eighteen boards. If 
a participant asked whether they were allowed to use either path, they were told “Do what 
you think.”  
 
8.1.4 Coding 
For each trial an undergraduate research assistant coded the path ratio, the side of 
the shorter path, the theme, the path taken by the experimenter and the path taken by the 
participant. A subset of 25% of the adult trials and 25% of the child trials were reliability-





8.2 RESULTS  
The responses for adults and children are summarized in figure 4, which shows 




Figure 4: Proportions of imitation responses in the opaque-attend to means, opaque-
baseline and transparent condition across path length ratios for adults (left) 
and children (right) in Experiment 4 
 We built logistic choice models to analyze the data, and used the same model 
selection criteria as for Experiments 1-3. The variables considered were condition, ratio 
(centered so that a ratio of 1:1 would be the baseline), trial (centered so that trial 1 would 
be the baseline) and, for children, mean-centered age and their respective interactions. 
We included participant as a random effect on the intercept. For adults, a model with 
condition, ratio and an interaction of the two as fixed effects offered the best fit to the 
data. For children a model with condition, ratio, an interaction of the two and trial as the 
three fixed effects offered the best fit for the data. Figure 5 shows the mean log odds and 





condition and ratio pairs for children and adults. A significant difference between two 
condition-ratio pairs exists (at alpha = 0.05, two-tailed) when the confidence interval of 
one pair does not overlap with the mean of the other pair. 
 
 
Figure 5: Mean and confidence intervals for the all combinations of condition and 
ration in experiment 4 for adults (left) and children (right) in Experiment 4 
The model for the adult data shows that when ratio is 1, imitation rate is the 
highest in the opaque-atm condition (mean log-odds: 3.221). It is significantly higher in 
the opaque-ATM condition than it is in the opaque-baseline (mean log-odds: 0.282, p < 
0.00005) and the transparent condition (mean log-odds: -0.436, p < 0.00005). There is, 
however, no significant difference between opaque-baseline and transparent. When ratio 
is 1.5, imitation rate in the opaque-atm condition is the highest (mean log-odds: 1.093), 
again significantly higher than in the opaque-baseline (mean log-odds: 1.738, p < 
0.00005) and the transparent condition (mean log-odds: -2.853, p < 0.00005). There is 
also a significant difference between the opaque-baseline and the transparent condition (p 





(mean log-odds: 1.338) and is significantly different from the opaque-baseline condition 
(mean log-odds: -1.410, p < 0.00005) and the transparent condition (mean log-odds: -
3.143, p < 0.00005). Imitation rate in the opaque-baseline condition is also significantly 
higher than in the transparent condition (p < 0.002). 
For the child data, the model shows that when ratio is 1, imitation rate is the 
highest in the opaque-atm condition (mean log-odds: 1.516). Imitation rate is 
significantly lower in both the opaque-baseline (mean log-odds: -0.096, p < 0.01) and the 
transparent condition (mean log-odds: -0.643, p < 0.00005). There is no significant 
difference between the opaque-baseline and the transparent condition. When ratio is 1.5, 
imitation rate is the highest in the opaque-atm condition (mean log-odds: 0.345) and it is 
significantly higher than in both the opaque-baseline (mean log-odds: -1.187, p < 0.02) 
and the transparent condition (mean log-odds: -2.199, p < 0.00005). There is a marginally 
significant difference between the opaque-baseline and the transparent condition (p < 
0.1). When ratio is 3, imitation rate is the highest in the opaque-atm condition (mean log-
odds: 0.381). It is significantly lower in the opaque-baseline condition  (mean log-odds: -
1.093, p < 0.02) and in the transparent condition (mean log-odds: -2.716, p < 0.00005). 
Also, imitation rate is significantly higher in the opaque-baseline condition than in the 
transparent condition (p < 0.005). Finally, there is an effect of trial (mean log-odds =  
-0.044, 95% CI [-0.082, -0.007], SE = 0.000, p < 0.02) 
 
8.3 DISCUSSION 
This experiment supports the hypothesis that the decision of whether to imitate or 
not is contingent on two things: the opacity of the function of the element that is to be 





In both adults and children we saw that there is a low rate of imitation when the 
situation was transparent, but a greater amount of imitation when the situation was 
opaque. The highest rate of imitation was seen when the participants were told to pay 
attention to the means that the experimenter used, a result that we attribute to the 
suggestion of a hidden goal. Further for both adults and children the ratio of path lengths 
had an impact on imitation rate. An increase in ratio resulted in a decrease in imitation. 
This decrease is stronger when the situation is transparent (and mechanistic efficiency is 
the only thing to take into account) and weaker when the situation is opaque. 
These findings support the main claim: Humans are more willing to chose the 
mechanistically more efficient strategy when the goals are clear and do not require 
deviating from efficiency. They are less willing to do so when the context leaves it open 
as to whether the mechanistically more efficient strategy might result in a failure to 
achieve a hidden (social) goal.  In line with the above, the effect of path length ratio 
varied between conditions. When the situation is transparent, choosing a much shorter 
path brings with it benefits in terms of mechanistic efficiency, but no penalties. When the 
situation is opaque, taking a much shorter path still is the mechanistically more efficient 
strategy, but the risk of not achieving a hidden social goal becomes much higher as well 
and to a degree outweighs the benefits. Thus the increase in path ratio leads to a lesser 
decrease in imitation rate in the opaque conditions. Finally, there is a small effect of trial 






SECTION 4: GENERAL DISCUSSION, FUTURE 
DIRECTIONS AND CONCLUSION 
Chapter 9: General Discussion 
The present research set out to further our understanding of imitation as a social 
learning mechanism for both actions and language across cultures. Past research has 
shown that human imitation goes beyond dumb mimicry - using social-cognitive skills, 
such as intention reading, humans imitate selectively, copying necessary actions more 
than unnecessary ones and intentional ones more than unintentional ones (Meltzoff, 1995; 
Carpenter, Akhtar and Tomasello, 1998; Bannard, Klinger and Tomasello, 2013). Despite 
this selectivity humans are the only species that imitates redundant and accidental actions 
at a high rate - they over imitate (Horner and Whiten, 2005). Recent research has also 
begun to investigate imitation in a cross-cultural context and found that while the human 
tendency to over imitate appears to be universal, the rate at which such overly faithful 
imitation occurs varies across cultures (Nielsen and Tomaselli, 2010; Clegg and Legare, 
in preparation; Berl and Hewlett, 2015). Most of the research on imitation has, however, 
focused exclusively on the instrumental rather than the verbal domain. 
In the present work we aim at providing a clearer picture of imitation, covering 
both the instrumental and the verbal domain, both selective imitation and over imitation 
and find the link between all of these traits of human imitation. In order to do so, we 
undertook a series of experimental studies. The first two experiments were recreations of 
experiment one and two of Bannard, Klinger and Tomasello (2013). The tasks consisted 
of an imitation game that explored (1) whether children would take into account a novel 
word’s function in the context of the utterance and (2) whether they would take into 





Experiment 1 was conducted with a group of Chatino children from Oaxaca, Mexico, a 
group of American children from Austin, Texas, USA and a group of Swiss children from 
Geneva, Switzerland. Experiment 2 was conducted on a group of Chatino children. For 
each of the two studies, we conducted an analogous instrumental control study as well. 
Experiment 3 was a replication of experiment three of Bannard, Klinger and Tomasello 
(2013). In this experiment we tested whether, like the German children tested by 
Bannard, Klinger and Tomasello, Chatino children were able to use intention reading 
when imitating verbal material. From the insights gained through the first three 
experiments we were then able to propose a unified theory that predicts when humans 
imitate, regardless of domain (instrumental or verbal) and culture. We then tested that 
theory in final fourth experiment. 
In Experiment 1 we found that English-speaking children from Austin, Texas, 
USA and French-speaking children from Geneva, Switzerland imitate novel adjectives 
selectively with respect to whether the novel word was required by the functional context. 
Chatino children on the other hand did not show such selectivity. The results of the 
French-speaking group from Geneva, Switzerland being in line with the Texas group rule 
out some explanations for these differences across groups. Firstly adjective position in 
the respective language does not impact imitation behavior - despite English having pre-
nominal and French having post-nominal adjectives, children from the two languages 
behave similarly in our imitation task. Additionally bilingualism can also be ruled out as 
an explanation for the behavior observed in the Chatinos. Both Chatino children and 
Swiss children are bilinguals, yet the Swiss children patterned like the monolingual 
American children. In Experiment 2 where the novel adjective clearly had a contrastive 





supporting our experience-based account. In a third experiment we ruled out another 
explanation, that Chatino children lacked the intention-reading capabilities required for 
selective imitation. This leaves us with the initial hypothesis that the difference in verbal 
imitation is due to the different ways adjectives are used in referring expressions across 
cultures.  
These findings are of particular interest because, on the basis of evidence from 
instrumental tasks, it has been proposed that imitation behavior is universal across 
cultures. The present research shows that while this might be true in most cases of 
imitation in the instrumental domain, in the domain of language there is variability. We 
propose that this variability stems from the differences in expectations regarding speech 
acts that children from different cultures and languages have. It then seems plausible that 
language is simply a domain where there is a greater amount of cross-cultural variability 
in the acts performed and the means used to perform them than in the instrumental 
domain (e.g., removing balls from novel boxes) in which previous studies have been 
conducted.  
Imitation being contingent on prior experience has important implications for 
general theories of imitation, as it helps provide an answer to the paramount question of 
when people imitate and when they do not. One possibility is that children over imitate 
when the model’s motives for their actions are opaque to them. In the instrumental task of 
Experiment 1, the purpose of the actions on the box was opaque to all children and hence 
all children over imitated. On the linguistic task, by contrast, the English- and French-
speaking children were able to attribute a descriptive function in one condition, but not in 





have not been familiar with the descriptive use of adjectives were unable to attribute such 
a function to the adjective in either condition and hence imitated in both conditions. 
This means that humans, when they can see the function (or lack of function) of 
elements of an action or communication, are able to selectively drop the redundant 
elements. When they are unsure about whether an element serves a function or not, they 
imitate. This hypothesis was tested in Experiment 4 and is supported by the results. In the 
board game task, when the rules indicate that there is no benefit to imitating the 
experimenter and taking the long path, participants do not imitate and take the short path. 
When the rules leave it unclear and, more so when they guide the participant towards the 
assumption that taking the long path might be a social goal of the task, participants 
imitate and take the long path at a higher rate. 
The explanation provided by this general theory of imitation for the results 
obtained from Experiment 1, 2 and 3 are as follows: While those studies show cross-
cultural differences in verbal imitation, the underlying mechanism that decides whether 
humans imitate or not might be universal. Different degrees of experience with certain 
communicative situations determine whether the function of a word produced by a model 
will be opaque or transparent to the learner and, in turn, whether the learner will imitate 
that word or omit it. As shown in Experiment 4, this principle seems to not only hold 
across cultures, but also across domains. 
The general theory proposed as a result of the four experiments that we conducted 
has several implications for language acquisition. In principle the language learner will 
faithfully imitate elements of an utterance that he or she does not yet understand. This 
allows for two things: (1) keep the social interaction going (fulfilling the social goal) 





on his or her own. Hence our theory suggests a model of language acquisition that is 
inherently socially motivated, as the learner acquires new elements socially from others, 
but also requires the learner to do part of the learning on his or her own, when he or she 
has to relate them to the world. 
In the context of language acquisition our theory is compatible with the idea of 
‘form and function pairings’ found in modern usage-based approaches to grammar (Croft, 
2001; Tomasello, 2003). This idea suggests that words and grammatical rules are not 
treated as two separate entities, but assumes that words are meaningful to the grammar of 
a language and vice versa. The grammar that the learner acquires is input driven and is 
build around and relies on detecting patterns in the input. 
Tomasello (2003) describes the learning process in several steps. First a child is 
exposed to and learns an entire utterance (e.g., “Givemetheball”). He or she is able to use 
it with a high level of success in its limited context, that is, to obtain the ball. Then, upon 
receiving additional input containing parts of the phrase, the child starts figuring out the 
meaning of the larger parts that constitute the utterance (e.g., that “Giveme” is used to 
obtain an object and “theball” refers to the particular object that is wanted). Tomasello 
(2003, p.92) calls this process of linking elements of an utterance to elements of meaning 
in the world “blame assignment”. As the individual elements of the utterance are not yet 
fully understood, errors can happen at this stage. After being exposed to even more input, 
the child is finally able to understand the meaning of every single element of the 
utterance and can generalize and draw abstractions from it. This would, for instance, 
entail the use of requests like ‘Could you give her the cup’ that are constructed by 





The idea that children first learn language in chunks (e.g., the first step of the 
learning mechanism outlined above), before they break it down into individual elements, 
receives empirical support from a recent study by Bannard and Matthews (2008). In their 
study, Bannard and Matthews had young children repeat the last word of a four-word 
sequence. They found that children are better at repeating the last word, when it, together 
with the first three words, forms a sequence that is high in frequency (“a drink of tea”), 
than when the resulting sequence is low in frequency (“a drink of milk”), supporting the 
idea that initially a whole sequence is learned, rather than individual words like ‘tea’ or 
‘milk’. 
Further support for the usage-based approach to grammar learning comes from 
research on the acquisition of the past tense in English. The English past tense contains 
regular forms, where applying rule-like behavior will lead the learner to the correct 
outcome (e.g., applying the “-ed” ending: play, play-ed), as well as irregular forms that 
cannot be predicted by the general rule (e.g., the past of “seek” is “sought” and not “seek-
ed”). When learning the past tense, young children display an interesting trajectory of 
competence. At first, when they have just learned the past tense of very few verbs, they 
correctly inflect both regular and irregular verbs. Then, as they learn more verbs, they 
start to make mistakes. For instance, they overgeneralize the regular “-ed” inflection to 
irregular verbs (e.g., “go-ed”), even if they previously inflected that same verb correctly 
(went). Then finally they are able to generalize the regular endings correctly to the 
regular verbs and use the respective correct irregular forms with the irregular verbs 
(Berko, 1958; Erwin, 1964). 
Neurocomputational research, albeit focusing on the underlying neural 





children who are acquiring the English past tense (e.g., Westermann, 1998; Westermann 
and Ruh, 2009; but see Chomsky, 1957 and Pinker, 1999 for a different approach). The 
learner learns each form as a whole, that is “play” is learned separately from “played”, no 
segmentation or identification of the meaning of the individual segments (i.e., stem, 
inflectional suffix) takes place. Then, as the learner receives more input containing the 
regular past tense ending “-ed”, he or she begins to detect the segment in the phrases he 
or she hears and starts trying to generalize it to other verbs. This is when 
overgeneralization errors (e.g., “go-ed”) occur. This means that even though the 
underlying understanding of the learner is greater than previously (they have some 
knowledge to the effect that “-ed” is the past tense ending and that “play” and “kick” are 
stems), the attempt to generalize that knowledge leads to a higher rate of errors. Later, the 
learner has received enough input to know when he or she can use the “-ed” ending and 
when the verb inflects irregularly. The learner then has an (almost) complete knowledge 
of the past tense and can inflect a wide range of verbs correctly. 
While the usage-based approach to learning certainly is very popular in the field 
of language acquisition, it may also offer an account of behavior observed in general 
developmental psychology, where similar patterns of learning occur. Supported by 
evidence from several linguistic and non-linguistic experiments, Karmiloff-Smith (1982) 
proposes that problem solving (learning) takes place in three distinct phases. These 
phases can be linked to stages of usage-based learning outlined above. In phase 1, the 
“procedural phase”, the behavior of the child is predominantly data-driven, that is, 
generated by the adaptation to external stimuli, and is success oriented, that is aimed 
towards achieving a goal. This first phase corresponds to the phase of usage-based 





on reaching the goal, but not on understanding the sequences individual components. 
Phase 2, the “metaprocedural phase”, is characterized by the behavior being generated 
internally rather than through external stimuli. In a sense the child is “figuring out” the 
task and mistakes happen more than in phase 1. This second phase corresponds to the 
phase in usage-based learning in which the learner attempts to break down the entire 
sequence into its elements and find the meaning of each element (blame assignment); the 
learner also uses some elements in other contexts, which leads to overgeneralization 
errors. Phase 3, “the conceptual phase”, introduces a “subtle control mechanism” that 
mediates between the afore-mentioned mechanisms, such that neither data from the 
environment, nor internal representations dominate the problem solving process. As in 
phase 1, very few errors happen, but the underlying mechanism is more complex and 
involves a greater understanding of the task that allows for generalization. The behavior 
in the third phase described by Karmiloff-Smith can be compared to the last stage of the 
usage-based model. The learner has segmented the sequence of words or actions and has 
a good understanding of the meaning of each individual element, so that the success rate 
is high and overgeneralization errors do not occur when using the elements in other 
contexts. 
Our findings from experiment 1 to 4 suggest that it might be of value to view 
social learning (e.g., imitation) through a usage-based lens. In our imitation studies, when 
the learner is first confronted with a novel sequence of actions or words, he or she has no 
idea what the individual elements of that sequence mean. The learner is focused on 
producing the correct outcome and imitates the whole sequence. An example of this 
would be the participants in the opaque-attend-to-means condition of experiment 4, who 





seemed to not make the assumption that the adjective in the one-object condition was 
unnecessary and thus displayed high rates of imitation across conditions. 
Then, when the learner has received more input, he or she starts to attempt to 
segment the sequence and assign meaning to its components. In this stage errors can 
happen, e.g., the learner drops an element of the sequence that was in fact not redundant, 
but necessary. The success rate may be worse than previously, when a goal-oriented 
always-imitate strategy was used. An example of this taken form experiment 4 would be 
participants who sometimes imitate (take the long path) and sometimes innovate (take the 
short path). 
Finally, when the learner has figured out the meaning of the individual elements, 
he or she knows when the imitation of an element is required and when he or she can be 
selective and omit unnecessary elements. This would, for instance, be the case in the 
transparent condition of experiment 4, where the participants are fully aware of the rules 
of the game and are able to see that taking the long path (imitating the experimenter) is 
unnecessary to reach the goal of the game. Similarly, western children in experiment 1 
and Chatino children in experiment 2 and 3 are mostly aware of the meaning of the 
adjective and selectively and successfully omit it when it is not required by the context. 
In conclusion, the present research offers new insights into imitation behavior that 









Chapter 10: Future Directions 
Our findings from experiment 1, 2 and 3 lead to the hypothesis that children 
imitate language (and actions) selectively, when the meaning of each element of an 
utterance (or action sequence) is clear to them. When the meaning of these elements is 
opaque to them, however, they imitate faithfully. We argued that Western children, who 
are familiar with the descriptive use of adjectives are able to imitate selectively in 
Experiment 1, while Chatino children, who are not familiar with that descriptive use of 
adjectives imitate faithfully instead. We suggest that the difference in understanding 
descriptive adjectives is due to differences in the amount of pedagogic dyadic caregiver-
child interaction across cultures: Children growing up in western middle class households 
participate in unusually high amount of dyadic caregiver-child interaction that leads to 
them being exposed to descriptive adjectives frequently, opposed to Chatino children, 
who in their daily life mostly interact with their peers. Although this hypothesis is 
strengthened by the findings of experiment 4, the study that explicitly test this hypothesis, 
further quantitative work on caregiver-child interaction (or peer-child interaction) in 
Chatino culture and on the linguistic input that Chatino children receive is required. 
The method that Gaskins (2000) used to study Mayan children lends itself to the 
task. It entails a quantitative analysis of both the macro and micro behavior of children. 
The macro analysis captures what time children allocate to what activities each day. To 
provide an adequate macro analysis Gaskins used a method called spot observation 
(Munroe and Munroe, 1971), in which the researcher takes a “snapshot” of what the 
children he or she is observing are doing every 5 minutes. This method would allow the 
researcher to obtain a good idea of how much time Teotepec Chatino children spend in 





microanalysis would then be a detailed video-based corpus study of children interacting 
with their parents and children interacting with their peers. This would provide much 
useful information on the kind and amount of child-directed speech Chatino children 
receive and could also be used to quantitatively determine their exposure to adjectives in 
the descriptive and contrastive function (Shneidman and Goldin-Meadow, 2012). As the 
factors that would be investigated by such a study are contingent on the age of the 
children, an age range from at least  2 to 10 years should be studied. 
While the above-described data collection and subsequent corpus creation and 
analysis would likely give strong support for the hypotheses put forward in the present 
research, they would also be a valuable resource for future research on child development 
and language acquisition in Chatino and, in the grand scheme of things, add to a growing 






Chapter 11: Conclusion 
In conclusion, the present research set out to extend quantitative studies on human 
imitation to the verbal domain and to do so in a cross-cultural context. We compared 
verbal and instrumental imitation behavior of children of two western and one indigenous 
culture. In particular we were interested in whether imitation behavior varies across 
domains (instrumental and verbal) and cultures (western vs. indigenous). We found that 
despite showing similar patterns in some of the tasks, western and indigenous children 
displayed different behaviors: While western children imitated novel adjectives 
selectively (imitate when the adjective was necessary in the context of the utterance, omit 
it when it was not), indigenous Chatino children imitated faithfully throughout. Backed 
up by evidence from subsequent studies, we proposed that these differences arise from 
differences in time spent in dyadic caregiver-child interactions across cultures, which 
might have lead to Chatino children having less experience with adjectives used in their 
descriptive function (when they serve to highlight a property of a referent, rather than 
when they serve to establish reference). We propose a general theory of imitation, which 
states that when humans decide whether to imitate or to omit elements, their decision is 
contingent on the opacity of the situation. When the situation is clear to them and they 
know the role that each element of an utterance or a sequence of actions plays, they can 
omit unnecessary elements, which results in selective imitation. When the situation is 
opaque to them and they do not know the role of all of those elements they resort to a 
safety-first strategy of faithful imitation - this allows them to (1) fulfill the social goal of 
the interaction, which is to keep the interaction going, (2) to retain elements that they do 
not yet understand in order to resolve their meaning later on. What elements of an 





growing up in one’s respective culture. Evidence from our last study supported this 
theory in a more general context that goes beyond the verbal domain. The present 
research thus adds to the growing field of work on human imitation by providing 
quantitative evidence in the previously underexplored linguistic domain, but also puts 






























kchin-X  Bottle 
tin-X  Glasses 
tun-X  Cup 
lwu-X  Spoon 
7en-X  Bucket 
Here ‘7’ stands for a glottal stop and ‘-X’ and ‘-K’ are relaxed tones. 
 
In the warm-up we additionally used the following items: airplane, key, die, 
big/small ball, long/short thread, red/blue block, dark/light bird, egg, horse, as well as the 
following adjectives: ka-X tun-X, ta-X kan-X. 
 



















In the warm-up we additionally used the following items: airplane, key, die, 
big/small ball, long/short thread, red/blue block, dark/light bird, egg, horse, as well as the 
following adjectives: noppy, lumby. 
















In the warm-up we additionally used the following items: airplane, key, die, 
big/small ball, long/short thread, red/blue block, dark/light frog, egg, horse, as well as the 
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